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Dr. Joel Kovarsky**
GENESIS

Since antiquity, man has been faced with the fact that his
bodily functions deteriorate with age and he must eventually die.
A fascinating variety of reactions have sprung from this basic realization. Witness man's search for eternal youth, a prominent literary
theme throughout recorded history. Alchemists once attempted to
discover a means of prolonging youth; ancient Chinese prophets
preached that the way to a longer life was to eat off gold plates; and
the "fountain-of-youth" concept can be found in the writings of the
4,000-year-old Edwin Smith Papyrus.! A more commonplace reaction to aging is evidenced by the prevalence of age discrimination
throughout history. For the purposes of the medical discussion later
undertaken, aging will be considered as a decreasing expectation of
life with the passage of time, unrelated to definable environmental
factors and manifested by some biological deterioration of the
human organism. These "definable environmental factors" change
considerably as our knowledge expands and produce corresponding
changes in the concepts of physiological aging. At present, there is
some consensus of opinion that the worker over forty-five years of
age has a tendency toward decreased industrial capability. As will
be subsequently established, the laws outlawing age discrimination
replace this industrial bias by relying more heavily on current medical thought.
* Professor of Business Administration, University of Iowa. LL.M. 1960, Yale University School of Law; Ph.D. 1956, University of Iowa.
** Duke University Medical Center, B.S. 1968, M.D. 1972, University of Iowa.
The authors would like to express their thanks to Veto Hauck, graduate student at the
University of Iowa, for his assistance in preparing this manuscript.
1. See A. COMFORT, THE PRocEss OF AGEING 3-6 (1964).
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The prevention of age discrimination goes beyond medical discovery, however, and reflects a strong public need to help those
facing unemployment. Between 1960 and 1970, the age group between forty-five and sixty-four increased numerically in most
states. 2 Only in Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New York, Vermont and Wisconsin was there a decline
in the total number of residents in this age group. During 1970, more
3
than 1,000,000 of the unemployed were over forty-five years of age.
Furthermore, approximately one-half of the unemployed was over
fifty-five years of age, and of those, one-third was unemployed for
nearly four months. Between 1969 and 1971, unemployment for
those over forty-five nearly doubled,4 and these statistics do not
reflect accurately the rate of unemployment because many elderly
people who are unable to find a job retire before sixty-five and are
not listed among the unemployed. At present, 37,000,000 people in
the United States are between forty and sixty-five years of age,
approximately forty-four percent of the 84,000,000 over sixteen
years of age. 5 By 1990, 47,000,000 persons will be between forty and
sixty-five years of age. Moreover, unemployment has affected both
the blue-collar worker and the white-collar worker, with many white
collar workers unable to meet large mortgages, taxes, and other
costly amenities.'
TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE AGED

The role and status of the aging person have varied with individual community attitudes and industrial developments. In the
ancient Hebraic agricultural society, the eldest male served as the
head of the family and was unquestionably the dominant figure.7
His dominance had been well established by biblical lore and reflected the respect instilled in the young for their elders. This leadership role prevails today in farming communities, in sharp contrast
with that exhibited in industry.' Since long life was viewed as a gift
from God, the patriarch was a natural leader in the agricultural
2.

U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION

& WELFARE,

FACTS AND FIGURES ON OLDER

AMERICANS, Table 5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FACTS & FIGURES].
3. See generally 2 1971 WHrrE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING 13.

4. Hearings on S. 555 Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 54-58 (1971).
5. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, at 1 (1972).
6. Hearings on Economics of Aging Before the Special Senate Comm. on Aging, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 1 (1969).
7. M. KELLER, SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY 61-64 (1968).
8. W. DONAHUE & C. TIBBITTS, POLITICS OF AGE 137-38 (1962).
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isolation of the ancient society. With this divine blessing, aging was
equated with wisdom and experience-a boon in a static, technologically free society. In light of the rapidly changing technology of
today, experience and past knowledge are often equated with obsolescence.
In contrast, the Greeks worshipped the young athlete and associated aging with failing health, deteriorating appearance, and
gradual diminution of grace.' Consequently, the elder Greek, though
young by today's standards, often welcomed death because of the
fear that his family might abandon him. Similarly, the citizensoldier, between nineteen and forty-seven years of age, was the dominant figure while Rome ruled the world. The Roman empire was
maintained by the young, tough, and aggressive citizen and some
authorities have suggested that Romans favored death "to suffering
the indignities of physical, mental, and social decay.""
During the Middle Ages, the average life span was thirty
years." Consequently, aging did not pose a significant problem for
agriculture or industry. It is likely that the age span of those doing
manual labor was shorter than those who did not work. One possible
explanation is that a sedentary existence has a beneficial effect on
some of the physical disabilities associated with age, such as myocardial infarction and h;pertension. Also, the sedentary individual
who was exposed to infectious disease and environmental toxins
could be more readily helped than those physically active. The limited protection accorded the older worker came from the church or
head of the estate upon which he worked.
Life in colonial America was rigorous and few lived to what one
today considers an advanced age.1 2 The Puritans closely followed the
Hebraic life-style, and the aged were entitled to considerable respect. The older white of the South, however, was generally excluded from the economic mainstream unless he happened to be a
plantation owner. The Protestant Ethic, the predominant force during the developing period in the United States, favored self-reliance,
freedom from government regulation, and, except for the black, an
open and competitive market place. According to this ethic, the
poor had only themselves to blame, and were left to look to their
church for alms. Later, charitable support for the poor was shifted
from the religious institutions to the general public without careful
9. KELLER, supra note 7, at 64-65.
10. Id. at 67.
11. Id. at 67-69.
12. Id. at 69-71.
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consideration of the economic system's growing emphasis on the
stronger and younger worker."
Today, aging workmen in the United States face problems of
employment that workers do not face in some European nations.
Because of high employment and smaller labor forces, countries like
Denmark and France provide incentives to induce older workers not
to retire. In the United States, because of unemployment and the
difficulty in finding jobs, older workmen are encouraged to retire."
Nevertheless, most workmen between forty and sixty-five are employed and collective bargaining agreements, arbitration, and legislation protect their jobs.' 5 Should plants reduce the size of their
workforce or close completely, however, older workers might find it
difficult to find suitable employment. The United States, committed to a high level of employment since the advent of Keynesian
economics, has been receptive to attacking age discrimination. Before exploring some of the legal and medical facets of the laws outlawing age discrimination, the gerontological approach of employers
and unions is in need of review.
INDUSTRY AND THE OLDER WORKER

In all probability, a thirty-five-year-old worker has chosen his
lifetime occupation. 6 After one has selected an occupation, a psychological attitude develops often causing emotional problems when
a shift to another occupation or industry is necessary. Although
considerably reduced since World War II, geographic immobility
remains. Moreover, the older worker who is willing to relocate exhibits substantial occupational immobility. In spite of the many complaints of boredom and the need to find a more stimulating work
environment, a worker frequently has serious misgivings about
shifting to another industry and developing new skills. These reservations, fostered either by a fear of the unknown or an absence of
motivation, are often rationalized by-"things could be worse elsewhere." Although family ties and friendship reduce geographic
mobility, occupational shifting should not be quite as difficult men13. By 1975 it is estimated that one-half of the population will be under 26 years of age.
See SECRETARY OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 3 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as LABOR REPORT].
14. SOBEL & WILCOCK, PLACEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR OLDER WORKERS 17 (1969).
15. LABOR REPORT, supra note 13, at 5. It was reported that "[a]lmost 97% of male
workers 45 and over were employed in 1964. Persons over 45 make up almost 40% of the
U[nited] S[tates] labor force, but only 27% of total unemployment, and only 17% of. .
unemployed registrants.
16. F. CLARK & A. DUNNE, AGING IN INDUSTRY 11 (1955).
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tally, especially when the industry or economy is unstable.
Since older workers generally have less education and face more
difficulty in changing jobs, it is likely that insufficient education
obstructs employment or promotion. When compared to older white
workers, the lack of education of older black workers is even more
pronounced." Although one can overestimate the value of formal
higher education and undervalue experience and self-education, a
transfer to another occupation does require specific formal schooling, often a frightening thought to undereducated workmen. For
older black workers, the difficulties are multiplied and extend beyond their educational shortage. Not only do they lack formal education, but also, older blacks have been denied the industrial experience and opportunities necessary to acquire job skills. In addition,
data does exist that substantiates the claim that older workers with
advanced education find suitable employment more readily than
their uneducated peers.'8 Where the supply of labor is scarce, job
seekers with limited education do not qualify for training in specialized positions such as therapists or systems analysts.'" Although a
highly motivated individual may overcome his educational handicap, employers often ignore this.
Another less-publicized factor is the impact of longer life spans
on occupational decisions. When the mean age of death was approximately forty-five, there was little need to consider two or more
careers. However, since the mean age is now approximately seventy
and laws protect employment rights until sixty-five, the probability
of technological change and job dissatisfaction becomes much
greater. In recognition of the inevitable changes brought by technology and longer lives, educators and publicists should be doing more
research to educate people concerning the potential benefits of following two occupational careers. Although the mean age of death for
blacks, Mexican-Americans, and Indians is less than that for white
Americans, no reason exists for them not to consider dual careers
as well."0 Due to education, medical care, diet, housing, occupation,
and other factors, minority workmen undergo more rapid physical
deterioration with advancing years.2 ' Some studies have found that
17.
18.
19.

LABOR REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
Id. at 12.
See generally 1971 WHIrE HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING 12.

20. Hearings on the Economics of Aging Before the Special Senate Comm. on Aging,
91st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 126 (1969).
21. There is a realization that because of the greater likelihood that he is engaged in
physical labor, the black worker may be less subject to coronary attack and other disabilities;
yet, diet and tension are also important factors in heart disease.
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a forty-eight-year-old Mexican-American migrant farm laborer
compares physically with a white American sixty-five years of age
in a less strenuous occupation. 22 Most migrant workers are black or
Mexican-American, lacking education and industrial training
which, coupled with their accelerated physical deterioration, gives
23
industrial employers many reasons to refuse employment.
As already mentioned, motivation is another pertinent factor in
considering an occupational change. 24 Older workers seeking jobs
may be less handicapped by physical and mental disabilities than
by the absence of motivation. For example, psychological tests show
that older workers often prefer solitary activities over those requiring interaction with coworkers or customers. To some, personal
achievement is less important as they grow older and dislike for
competition increases. Although few over the age of thirty-five strive
for a second career, a legal framework protecting the older worker
would provide incentive for those who are so inclined.
Older workers furloughed after spending many years in a declining industry face considerable difficulty finding other employment because a shift in industrial allegiance is necessary. In declining industries like lumber, furniture, leather, and mining, and also
in expanding industries such as telephone, gas and electric utilities,
finance, insurance, and real estate, older workers released from jobs
are without skills to satisfy the needs of potential employers.2 For
example, the demand for bakers, blacksmiths, boilermakers, bookbinders, cabinet makers, and jewelers has been declining, and these
workers find it difficult to move to other industries. 2 81 Although educational background, past training, and motivation present a formidable barrier, age laws could provide the help needed to surmount
these obstacles.
Substantial evidence demonstrates that employers practice age
discrimination by advancing excuses not supported by the facts. As
stated in one report:
The 1965 survey shows . . . restrictions (i) in skilled occupations, the traditional crafts, and the professional and semiprofessional positions, . . . , and

(ii) in the expanding but traditionally lower paid retail sales and service occupations. Age limitations are most frequent for clerical positions and for semiskilled and unskilled work, and for outside salesmen. Similarly, the manufacturing industries, with the notable exception of apparel, are hiring relatively
22. 1971 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING 166.
23. H. SHEPPARD, TowARD AN INDUSTmAL GERONTOLOGY 97 (1970).
24. Id. at 62-66. There is some evidence that training courses in motivation can overcome inertia.
25. See 1971 WHrrE HousE CONFERENCE ON AGING 13.
26. B. SCHNEIDER, THE OLDER WORKER 6 (1962).
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few people over 45. Retail stores, hotels, personal and medical service indusare generally hiring older workers in substantries, and government agencies
27
tially larger proportions.

Employer's reasons for not hiring or promoting older workers are:
1. Older workers are often afflicted with physical and mental
affirmities.
2. Young people must be hired who can be trained, motivated
and promoted.
3. Young people are willing to work for less money than older
people.
4. Pension, health and life insurance costs increase as the
worker ages.
5. Many older workers lack skill, experience or education.
6. According to mortality tables, the older worker will work less
time for the firm than a younger worker.
7. Older workers are more costly to train and are less productive.
8. Older workers are less adaptable and more difficult to train
than younger workers.
9. Balance in age is needed in every work force. Because seniority clauses in collective bargaining agreements determine retention and promotion, employers need to hire young persons whenever possible.
10. Young executives feel uncomfortable directing older employees.
The most common reason for not hiring older workers relates
to the assumption of physical deterioration.n Some evidence exists
to support the contention that physical productivity drops slightly
after forty-five years of age and is followed by a substantial decrease
after age sixty. However, the overall performance of older workers,
particularly when strenuous physical labor is not entailed, compares
favorably with that of the younger workers. In most instances, productivity is determined by independent variables such as the occupation and physical condition of the worker coupled with his individual motivation. Age discrimination is most prevalent in unskilled
and semi-skilled jobs, in which physical strength is required and
undesirable working conditions are commonplace.2 9 Obviously this
generalization would not apply in retracting industries in which
27.

LABOR REPORT, supra note 13, at 7. Note that in the industries in which older workers

are being hired, the pay scale tends to be less than in many other industries.
28. Id. at 8-9.
29. See generallyDisprovingPrejudicesAgainst Older Workers, 30 L.R.R.M. 15 (1952).
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collective bargaining agreements protect older workers.
Other important factors that affect the employment of older
workers are general economic conditions, community attitudes, and
advances in technology." For example, if the supply of labor is short
and demand high, older workers become acceptable to employers.
As medical knowledge expands and the negative effects of physiological and environmental aging are further limited, even less reason
exists for challenging worker efficiency. "55.8% of the Nation's older
population and 54.8% of its total population" are domiciled in states
like California, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey." In 1970 in Iowa,
20.4 percent of the total population was between forty-five and
sixty-five, a 1.4 percent increase from 1960 to 1970.32 Such statistics
indicate that protection for older workers is definitely needed in
states with a large aging population. When average age is relatively
high and young people either continue their education, enter the
military, or leave the state, employers are less likely to discriminate
33
against older workers.
Not only are employers unlikely to engage in age discrimination
when young workers are in short supply, but the reasons assigned
by employers for refusing to hire older workers are not acceptable
under state or federal law. For example, even though equally competent younger workers can be hired for less, employers cannot refuse
to hire older applicants merely because higher wages may be demanded. Prior to the Wagner Act of 1935,'3 employers could legally
reduce wages. Under classical economic theory the savings would be
passed to consumers through reduced prices. Moreover, demand
would rise and lead to increased employment and overall benefit for
society. Although the Wagner Act did not specifically alter classical
economic theory, the congressional goal of promoting union growth
succeeded admirably. As unions became powerful, they stabilized
and gradually increased wages in both the organized and unorganized firms. Even before the passage of laws prohibiting age discrimination, those employers bargaining with unions or those paying
3
minimum wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act
could not underpay younger workers. If a collective bargaining
30.
31.
32.
33.
(1952).
34.
35.

See LABOR REPORT, supra note 13, at 8.
FACTS & FIGURES, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at Table 1.
But see Manpower Policy on Older Workers in Defense Programs,30 L.R.R.M. 3086
29 U.S.C. §§ 151.68 (1970).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970).
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agreement does not exist or the minimum wage laws are not applicable, employers may pay younger employees less than older employees. The age law in Iowa specifically protects younger workmen, who
are between eighteen and forty years of age. Thus, thirty-five-yearold workers could claim a violation if eighteen-year-olds are preferred. Under Iowa and federal law, older job applicants willing to
work for the same wages as a younger applicant could also establish
3
a violation. 1
According to the age laws, both young and old people are to be
trained to assume skilled positions and responsibility. Although a
court would probably not require an employer to hire a sixty-threeyear-old trainee for certain positions, age as a factor for training has
been outlawed. The time factor involved in training has always been
a tenuous excuse for not hiring older workers. Generally, the time
spent in training programs is relatively short for most jobs. In some
white collar occupations-art teachers, music and dancing, design,
photography, cartooning-the training period is anywhere from two
to ten years.3 7 For insuranc6 agents, brewmasters, harbor masters,
the training period is from four to ten years.3 In such blue collar

skills as machinists, die makers, pressmen, engravers, electricians,
the training period is from two to ten years. Since these are among
the most skilled occupations, the relative training period for other
occupations is considerably less. In addition, some training programs for skilled jobs operate more as a device to control the supply
of eligible workers than as a means of training skilled labor.
The assumption made by some employers that young employees are more inclined to remain with the firm longer than older
employees is also questionable. During times of depression, younger
employees, unable to find other opportunities, might well devote
more years of service to a single employer than would older employees newly hired. Given the general prosperity in the United States
since World War II, however, younger employees are less likely to
remain with the firm than older workers. Although employers must
provide opportunities to retain younger employees, openings leading
to promotion are limited. Generally, older blue collar workers will
not have as many opportunities to seek employment elsewhere.
The claims that older workers are less adaptable and more
difficult to train than younger workers also have not been substantiated. For example, employers cannot cite arthritic pains, which
36. See Table 1 containing the state and federal laws.
37. DIMCTONARY OF OCCUPATONAL TrrLs 18-19 (Supp. to 3d ed. 1965).
38. Id. at 25-28.
39. Id. at 133-280.
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typically afflict those over forty years of age, as an excuse not to hire
older workers." People with arthritis, as well as other maladies, are
adaptable and can be trained. It is possible, however, that age does
lead to personality changes which affect the adaptability of older
workers." Not only may the loss of friends and family lead to personality difficulties but "the EEG findings . . . suggest that the electrical activity of the brain undergoes change with age, regardless of
whether detectable physical disease is present or not. . . .Health,
status, particularly cardiovascular disease, is, however, an important factor influencing brain potentials ....,,12
Yet this problem
remains only a possibility and nothing more. Since studies conducted under various conditions may produce significant statistical
differences, the studies advanced to document this position may not
be reliable.
MEDICAL DATA

Surveys made by the National Association of Manufacturers
and the United States Chamber of Commerce show that twenty-six
percent of the firms polled do not hire workers over forty-five years
of age.13 It seems probable that many more firms refuse to hire or
promote older workers without making it an express policy. Since
firms cite physical or mental disabilities to justify age discrimination, examination of the medical evidence supporting or refuting
this position must be reviewed.
MEASUREMENTS OF AGING

The human body is probably at its peak physiologic vigor at
about twelve years of age.44 Physiologic functions that tend to decline with age in humans include basal metabolic rate, vital capacity,
maximal breathing capacity, renal blood flow and others." Care
must be taken when interpreting these changing functions. The fact
that a system deteriorates with age, or an illness is more frequent
with advancing age, does not means that the dysfunction is primarily due to physiologic aging. One may be witnessing the effects of
40. Cf. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Employment and Retirement Incomes of the
Special Senate Comm. on Aging, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 237 (1971).

41. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HUMAN AGING:
BEHAvIoRAL STUDY, 1, 91, 153 (1963) (Pub. Health Serv. Publ. No. 986).
42.

A

BIOLOGICAL AND

Id. at 311.

43. B.
44. A.

SCHNEIDER, THE OLDER WORKER 8 (1962).
COMFORT, THE PROCESS OF AGING 1 (1964).

45. Strehler, Originand Comparisonof the Effects of Time and High-energyRadiations
on Living Systems, 34 Q. REv. Bio. 117, 120 (1959).
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the external environment manifested by infectious disease, food
supply or various occupational factors.
Though the mean life-span in this country has improved during
this century, the maximum life-span has not changed in spite of all
modem medical advances." This can be further underscored by
realizing that the maximum life-span has probably not increased
from antiquity.47 The mean life-span of the ancient Roman was
certainly less than that of the modem American, but upon reaching
the age of 70 life expectancy for the two groups is about the same.
The shorter mean life expectancy for the Roman was probably due
to environmental factors. The peak incidence of a particular disease
is in some instances a useful index of physiologic age, but the data
may be difficult to interpret and extreme care must be taken in the
application of this measure. 8 For example, it has been suggested
that the incidence of cancer is an index of physiologic aging, 49 but
some authors feel the cancer-afflicted population is distinct and not
a valid index of "normal" aging. Another indicator of physiologic
aging is the "characteristic oldest age" as indicated by the average
age of the last few surviving members of a given population.5 1 As
long as the species population is large enough, the characteristic
oldest age seems independent of definable environmental factors.
Life table statistics may lead to the assumption that chronologic age reflects physiologic age. Although usually true, this is not
always the case and several clinical conditions will be discussed
which are presumably associated with premature senescence. One
common way of assessing the "aging rate" is by plotting the percentage of a population surviving against time. Clearly this data may
be difficult to interpret and is influenced by many environmental
factors. 2 For example, older people dying in a given year have a
different nutritional and environmental life history than younger
people dying in the same year. Furthermore, life expectancy statistics are not helpful when deciding claims of discrimination under
the age laws.
46.

Lew & Seltzer, Uses of the Life Table in PublicHealth, 48 MmBANK MEm. FUND Q.

15-37 (Oct. pt. 2 1970).

47. COMFORT, supra note 44, at 86-91; R. WALFoRD, THE IMMUNOLOGIC THEORY OF AGING
104 (1969).
48. Simms, Berg & Davies, Onset of Diseaseand the Longevity of Rat and Man, in 5
CmA FOUNDATION COLLOQUIA ON AGEING, The Life Span of Animals 72 (1959); Berg & Simms,
Nutrition and Longevity in the Rat, 71 J. NUT. 255 (1960).
49.

WALFORD,

50.
51.

Kohn, Human Aging and Disease, 16 J. CHRONIc Dis. 5 (1963).
Sacher, Relation of Lifespan to Brain Weight and Body Weight in Mammals, in 5

supranote 47.

CIBA FOUNDATION COLLOQUIA ON AGEING,

52.

The Life Span of Animals 115, 117 (1959).

Davies, Mortality and Morbidity Statistics, 9 J.

GEONTOL.

186 (1954).
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Cohort analysis is a better but more difficult measure of the
aging rate. Here, a mortality curve is constructed from individuals
born at the same time.53 This process is easier to accomplish in a
controlled laboratory setting where the subjects are animals with
life-spans much shorter than man's. It is obviously much more difficult to study human populations in controlled and identical environmental conditions. While data obtained from aging studies of
animals should be applied to human populations with caution, it is
often the only data available. Experimental designs vary greatly
with respect to control methods, statistical techniques and other
variables. Population studies, especially as applied to humans, are
often crude and conclusions based on similar data are drawn with
variable accuracy, as reflected by the conflicting opinions presented
in the medical literature. Perhaps more accurate information can be
obtained from population studies as physicians become more familiar with the application of biomathematical techniques to risk function analysis. There is a distinct need to evaluate several risk factors
of a given disease simultaneously as continuous quantitative variables .

Morbidity factors must also be considered in an assessment of
the aging process. How does one assess the impact of disease or age
on a person's life, occupation or capacity for work? This question is
at least as complex as analyzing mortality statistics, since it is
extremely difficult to develop precise criteria to measure anatomic
impairment. Furthermore, sound criteria for converting anatomic
impairment to functional disability are even harder to find. A related problem is the question of "percent disability." How does a
physician evaluate the psychosocial aspects of an illness in conjunction with the physical manifestations when fixing a "percent disability?" These aspects are extraordinarily difficult to standardize.
At this point in medical history it is probably unwise to attempt to
diffuse standardizations too quickly. Individual physicians may differ in their assessments of the same patient and the criteria for
establishing a given diagnosis may vary as well (see subsequent
discussion on diabetes mellitus). In addition, few attempts are
made to assess the various psychosocial aspects of aging because of
the difficulty in identification. Comfort has suggested the standardized measurement of several clinical and laboratory parameters in
53.

Jones, The Relation of Human Health to Age, Place, and Time, in

AGING AND THE INDIVIDUAL

54.

HANDBOOK OF

336 (J. Birren ed. 1959).

Stamler & Epstein, CoronaryHeart Disease: Risk Factorsas a Guide to Preventive

Action, 1 PREv.

MED.

27 (1972).
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an attempt to assess more precisely the human aging rate." He cites
the need to establish aging assessment units in order to begin controlled longitudinal studies under a variety of conditions, including
long-term pharmacological manipulation (the physical, constitutional and ethical problems implicit in such studies are not discussed). Several centers for the study of aging have already been
established in this country to gather such important information.
There are several laboratory techniques which may yield information in the future regarding the overall process of aging. Of particular interest are techniques employing explanted cell and tissue
cultures. As the donor's age increases, the ability to initiate growth
from a variety of tissue explants decreases." Fibroblasts are frequently used for cell cultures. Though fibroblasts from different
sites may have different physical properties, all normal human fibroblasts show a characteristic three-phase growth cycle.5 7 The final
phase usually occurs within a year of culture initiation and is characterized by a gradual loss of the ability to divide (mitotic potential)
which eventually culminates in cell death. Hayflick and Moorhead
reported that normal human cells seem to have a finite life-span in
culture. 8 Further reports find an increase in the number of cells
with other than the normal number of chromosomes for that cell
type (aneuploid cells) in the last few subcultures before cell lines
cease to divide. 9 An inverse correlation exists between the chronologic age of the cell donor and the in vitro life-span of the explanted
cell culture. 0 Fibroblasts from patients with progeria, a syndrome
thought to be a model of premature senescence, have a decreased
in vitro life-span as compared to chronologically age-matched controls."' Hayflick notes that many in vivo cell lines do not actually
reach the point where they will not reproduce in some way. 2 He
55. Comfort, Test-battery to Measure the Aging-rate in Man, 2 LANCETr 1411 (1969).
56. Soukupovi, Hole~kovd & Hn~vkovsk , Changes of the Latent Period of Explanted
Tissues During Ontogenesis, in AGING IN CELL AND TISSUE CULTURE 41 (E. Hole~kovd & V.
Cristofalo eds. 1970).
57. Hayflick, The Limited In Vitro Lifetime of Human Diploid Cell Strains, 37 Exp.
CELL RES. 614 (1965); Martin, Sprague & Epstein, ReplicativeLife-span of CultivatedHuman
Cells: Effect of Donor's Age, Tissue, and Genotype, 23 LAB. INVEST. 86 (1970).
58. Hayflick & Moorhead, The Serial Cultivation of Human Diploid Cell Strains, 25
Exp. CELL RES. 585-621 (1961).
59. Saksela & Moorhead, Aneuploidy in the Degenerative Phase of Serial Cultivation
of Human Cell Strains, 50 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. SC. USA 390-95 (1963).
60. Goldstein, Littlefield & Soeldner, Diabetes Mellitus and Aging: DiminishedPlating
Efficiency of CulturedHuman Fibroblasts,64 PROc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. USA 155-69 (1960). See
Martin, Sprague & Epstein, supra note 57.
61. Goldstein, Lifespan of Cultured Cells in Progeria,1 LANcET 424 (1969).
62. Hayflick, The Biology of Human Aging, 265 AM. J. MED. Sci. 433 (1973).
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states that this cessation of cell replication is merely a convenient
parameter to measure in tissue culture, and notes that in vivo functional losses preceding cessation of cell division may actually give
rise to many of the clinical and biochemical manifestations of aging.
Many of these tissue culture findings have implications relating to
the genetic aspects of aging discussed below.
CLINICAL CONCOMITANTS OF INCREASING AGE

The exact cause of aging is not known. 3 There are numerous
theories, including immunologic, 4 genetic, 5 free radical reactions,66
and collagen maturation." Genetic and immunologic theories are
currently the most popular and are probably interrelated. Experimental data are complex and often difficult to interpret. These
theories will not be discussed further here and the reader is referred
to the footnotes cited for further information.
It is difficult to be certain that any age-associated biological
change is due to a "primary aging process." Many bodily functions
are affected by diverse circumstances over the passing years. This
is not intended to be an exhaustive review, but rather a brief summary of several clinical areas where the deteriorative aspects of
advancing chronologic age might be deemed more serious in terms
of mortality and morbidity.
63.

Curtis, Genetic Factorsin Aging, 16 ADV.

GENET.

305 (1971); Goldstein, The Biology

of Human Aging, 285 N. ENG. J. MED. 1120 (1971).
64. T. Makinodan, AGE-RELATED CHANGES IN ANTIBODY

FORMING CAPACITY

3-17 (M. Sigel

& R. Good eds. 1972); Burnet, Somatic Mutation and Chronic Disease, 1 BR. MED. J. 338
(1965); Cammarata, Rodnan & Fennell, Serum Anti-gamma-globulin and Antinuclear Factors in the Aged, 199 J.A.M.A. 455 (1967); Giannini & Sloan, A Tuberculin Survey of 1,285
Adults with Special Reference to the Elderly, 1 LANcET 525 (1957); Hallgren, Buckley, Gilbertsen & Unis, Lymphocyte Phytohemagglutinin Responsiveness Immunoglobulins and
Autoantibodiesin Aging Humans, 111 J. IMMUNOL. 1101 (1973); Svec & Veit, Occurrenceand
Characteristicsof Organ-Specific Antibodies in Sera of Aged Persons, 73 J. LAB. CuN. MED.
379 (1969); see Walford, supra note 47, at 11-20.
65. W. M. Court Brown, HumAN POPULATION CYTOGENEMCS 10 (1967); Lansing, General

Biology of Senescence, in HANDBOOK

OF AGING AND THE INDIVIDUAL 119

(J. Birren ed. 1959);

Jervis, Premature Senility in Down's Syndrome, 17 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. Sc. USA 559 (1970);
Nielsen, Johansen & Yde, Frequency of Diabetes Mellitus in Patients with Klinefelter's
Syndrome of Different Chromosome Constitutions and the XYY Syndrome, Plasma Insulin
and Growth Hormone Level After a Glucose Load, 29 J. CUN. ENDOCRINOL. & METAB. 1062
(1969); Post & Hoffman, Cell Renewal Patterns, 279 N. ENGL. J. MED. 248 (1968).
66. Chio, Reiss, Fletcher & Tappel, Peroxidationof Subcellular Organelles:Formation
of Lipofuscinlike FluorescentPigments, 166 ScIENCE 1535 (1969); Harman, Prolongationof
Life: Role of Free Radical Reactions in Aging, 17 J. AM. GERIATR. Soc. J. 721 (1969).
67. Piez, Cross-Linking of Collagen and Elastin, 37 ANNUAL RaV. BIOCHEM. 547 (1968);
Verzar, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Factorsof Molecular Ageing, 3 ExP. GERONTOL. 69 (1968).
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A.

Senile Dementia

It has been estimated that eighty-five percent of the patients
in the United States institutionalized with a diagnosis of organic
dementia have the pathological equivalent of the presenile dementia, Alzheimer's disease." This form of dementia associated with
advancing age is termed senile dementia. The pathological hallmarks of Alzheimer's disease are the twisted tubule, found in neurofibrillary tangles, and the senile plaque."9 A definite cause-andeffect relationship between these pathological alterations and senile
dementia has not yet been established. 0 These pathological alterations are not necessarily specific for these clinical conditions. There
is also a distinct, though often mild, loss of neurons in the cerebral
cortex with advancing age. 7' Subcellular organelles72 in nervous tissues manifest certain changes with advancing age.
The entity of "arteriosclerotic dementia" is generally overdiagnosed, in reality often representing senile dementia. 73 One large
study, slanted towards populations from more economically privileged countries, indicates that the mean age of clinical onset is
approximately seventy-four years for both sexes, with a range of
fifty-six to ninety-two years of age.74 The authors found no relationship between the incidence of senile dementia and socioeconomic
status. One autopsy series revealed that of all patients dying during
their seventh decade, approximately eighty-one percent had to some
degree the pathological alterations discussed as characteristics of
senile dementia. By the eighth decade, varying degrees of these
pathological changes could be found in ninety-nine percent of the
autopsied cases.75 There appears to be a positive correlation between
the presence of dementia as measured by a standardized battery of
psychological tests, and the concentration of senile-associated path68.
69.
NEUROL.

See 3 R. ADAMS & R. SIDMAN, INTRODUCTION TO NEUROPATHOLOGY 511 (1968).
Terry, Neuronal Fibrous Protein in Human Pathology, 30 J. NEUROPATHOL. ExP.

8 (1971).

70. Wisniewski, Terry & Hirano, NeurofibrillaryPathology, 29 J. NEUROPATHOL. Exp.
NEUROL. 163 (1970).
71. See Brody, Organizationof the Cerebral Cortex, 102 J. CoMP. NEUROL. 511 (1955).
72, Bondareff, Histophysiology of the Aging Nervous System, 1 ADv. GERONTOL. RES. 1
(1964); Brody, The Deposition of Aging Pigment in the Human Cerebral Cortex, 15 J.
GERONTOL. 258 (1960).
73. See Terry, supra note 69.
74. Larsson, Sjogren & Jacobson, Senile Dementia, 39 ACTA PSYCHIAT. SCAND. 1 (Supp.
167, 1963).
75. Matsuyama, Namiki & Watanabe, Senile Changes in the Brain in the Japanese:
Incidence of Alzheimer's Neurofibrillary Change and Senile Plaques in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FiFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF NEUROPATHOLOGY 979-80 (Excerpta Medica Series 100,

1966).
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ologic changes observed at autopsy." Note, however, that the age
laws do not apply after sixty-five and few remain in the work force.
There is a danger signal here. If this clinico-pathologic relationship is as close as it appears, and if we continue to increase the mean
human life-span, both the incidence (number of newly diagnosed
cases of a given disease per 100,000 population per year) and prevalence (number of persons with a given disease per 100,000 population
at a given time) of serious psychological dysfunction in our elderly
population may show a marked increase.77 The morbidity inflicted
by this non-replicating group of cells would become frightfully obvious. We might approach the character of the people called
"struldbruggs," described by Swift in Gulliver's Travels. These
immortal beings were cursed with the inability to die, just becoming
older, crazier, and more despised with time. The sight of these poor
people tempered even Gulliver's desire for immortality.
B.

Coronary HeartDisease

Of approximately 626,000 coronary deaths in 1967, about
167,000 were in people thirty-five to sixty-four years of age (three
males to one female) .7An apparently healthy male from the United
States has about a twenty percent chance of developing clinical
coronary heart disease before the age of sixty, mostly in the form of
myocardial infarction. Of those middle-aged persons recovering
from an initial heart attack, the chance of dying within the next five
years is approximately five times as great as persons without a
history of coronary heart disease.7 9 Annual financial losses, both for
medical care and production losses, are estimated to be in the billions of dollars. 0 On account of these statistics, employers are reluctant to hire or retain employees with a history of heart disease.
Coronary heart disease is a striking cause of premature death
in this and other industrialized nations. It has been shown that
atherosclerosis probably evolves in distinct pathological steps, the
earliest lesion being the fatty streak. This streak then progresses to
76. Roth, Tomlinson & Blessed, CorrelationBetween Scores for Dementia and Counts
of "Senile Plaques" in Cerebral Grey Matter of Elderly Subjects, 209 NATURE 109 (1966).
77. See Terry, supra note 69.
78. Inter-Society Commission for Health Disease Resources, Atherosclerosis Study
Group and Epidemiology Study Group, Primary Prevention of the Atherosclerotic Disease,

42 CIRCULATION A55 (1970).
79.

Stamler, Berkson & Lindberg, Risk Factors:Their Role in the Etiology and Patho-

genesis of the Atherosclerotic Diseases, in THE

PATHOGENESIS

OF

ATHEROSCLEROSIS

41 (R.

Wissler & J. Greer eds. 1972); Stamler, Acute Myocardial Infarction-Progressin Primary
Prevention, 33 BR. HEART J. 145 (Supp. 1971).
80. See 2 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HEART DISEASE, CANCER AND STROKE (1965).
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the fibrous streak, and then calcifies with such ensuing complications as hemorrhage, ulceration, and thrombosis." The transition
phase of fatty streak to fibrous streak is evident in many by thirty
years of age and often accelerates by age forty. In one study, about
eighty percent of patients under fifty who had evidence of coronary
artery disease by angiography had a demonstrable abnormality of
serum lipids.2
The major well-established identifiable risk factors for coronary
heart-disease are elevated serum cholesterol, cigarette smoking and
hypertension. 3 In this context, age and sex can be considered factors
involving fundamental biology generally not amenable to exogenuous influences." Though the incidence of coronary heart disease
does seem to increase with age, this does not appear to be a major
risk factor in and of itself, particularly in regard to premature mortality. Even in those that have experienced heart disease, productivity in the plant may not be impaired. Age matched controls indicate
that as age increases, the relative risk of having a heart attack at a
given elevation of serum cholesterol increases. Data indicate that
serum cholesterol level is predictive of mortality rates for men recovering from one or more heart attacks occurring in middle-age.
Though serum cholesterol tends to increase with age throughout
middle life, the serum level tends to fall about the seventh decade.,
Data indicate that for each age and sex group, the coronary heart
disease mortality rate increases with the intensity of cigarette smoking. Apparently the younger the age-group (based on patients forty
to eighty-four years) the higher the relative mortality risk associated
with smoking. Autopsy data indicate a significant relationship between hypertension and the severity of atherosclerosis." Men with
81.

Strong, Eggen & Oalmann, The NaturalHistory, GeographicPathology, and Epide-

miology of Atherosclerosis,in THE PATHOGENESIS OF ATHEROSCLEROSIS 20 (R. Wissler & J. Greer
eds. 1972).
82. Heinle, Levy, Frederickson & Gorlin, Lipid and Carbohydrate Abnormalities in
Patientswith AngiographicallyDocumented CoronaryArtery Disease, 24 AM. J. CARDIOL. 178
(1969).
83. Stamler, Epidemiology of CoronaryHeart Disease, 57 MED. CLIN. N. AM. 5 (1973);
see Stamler & Epstein, supra note 54.
84. Grundy, A RATIONAL APPROACH TO THE "AT RISK" CONCEPT, 2 LANCET 1489 (1973);
Leren, Effect of Plasma Cholesterol-Lowering Diet in Male Survivors of Myocardial
Infarction, 181 ACTA MED. SCAND. (Supp. 466 1967).
85. Thompson, Nichols & Obrist, Relation of Service Cholesterol to Age, Sex, and Race,

20 J.

GERONTOL.

86.

19

160 (1965).

Hammond, Smoking in Relation to Death Rates of One Million Men and Women,

NAT'L CANCER INST. MONO.

127 (1966); Hammond & Garfinkel, CoronaryHeart Disease,

Stroke and Aortic Aneurysm-Factorsin the Etiology, 19 ARCH. ENVIRON. HALTH 167 (1969).
87. See Stamler, Berkson & Lindberg, supra note 79.
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"true" hypertension (diastolic elevation with or without concomitant systolic elevation), along with those with just systolic hypertension, are more likely to develop clinical coronary heart disease when
88
compared to age-matched controls.
More emphasis needs to be placed on the application of preventive medicine to the problem of coronary heart disease, since all the
major risk factors identified above are potentially amenable to therapy. 89 The aging process itself does not seem to be a major factor in
the premature mortality from coronary artery disease.9" Closer cooperation between business and medicine is needed to identify populations prone to coronary heart disease. Some large industrial firms
have already begun programs aimed at their young executives that
emphasize, among other factors, the importance of dietary cholesterol intakes. In terms of the specific employability of the coronary
patient, a qualified physician must make the decision in each case.
The age discrimination laws lead to this goal by requiring the employer to look at the individual.
C. Diabetes Mellitus
In a clinical series of insulin-dependent diabetics with a history
of disease greater than twenty years duration, an increased prevalence of thyrogastric autoantibodies (antithyroid and antiparietal
cell), "autoimmune" disease (hyperthyroidism and pernicious anemia) and vascular disease was found." The prevalence of thyrogastric autoantibodies (antithyroid and antiparietal cell), to "autoimmune" disease (hyperthyroidism and pernicious anemia) and vascular disease was found. The prevalence of thyrogastric antibodies
in those patients less than forty years old reached a level comparable to nondiabetic controls greater than sixty years old. With advanced age, the prevalence of these thyrogastric antibodies in
insulin-dependent diabetics eventually fell. This fall was attributed
to a disproportionately high death rate among diabetics with the
autoantibodies. It was then surmised that if the development of
autoantibodies was an index of aging, then the aging process in
88. See Stamler, supra note 83.
89. Dayton, Pearce, Hashimoto, Dixon & Tomiyasu, A Controlled Clinical Trial of a
Diet High in UnsaturatedFat, 40 CIRCULATION 1-63 (Supp. 2 1969); see Stamler, supra,notes
79 & 83.
90. There are many other clinical cardiological problems such as congestive heart failure and angina pectoris which relate to morbidity and mortality that will not be discussed
here.
91. Whittingham, Mathews, Mackay, Stocks, Ungar & Martin, DiabetesMellitus, Autoimmunity, and Ageing, 1 LANcer 763 (1971).
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certain insulin-dependent diabetics was advanced some twenty
years over that in nondiabetic age-matched controls.
Although dramatic, this conclusion is speculative and certainly
not to be used as a hiring standard by employers or as courtroom
evidence. In fact, it does not represent the situation for the noninsulin-dependent diabetic majority. The relationship between diabetes and advancing age is quite complex. In most persons, there is
a progressive deterioration of performance in each advancing decade
of life on almost all the commonly used laboratory parameters for
assessing diabetes. 2 However, many biochemical investigations of
aging patients are made on institutionalized individuals over sixtyfive years old. These institutionalized patients represent a minority
of the over-sixty-five population and cannot be necessarily considered a representative sampling of the aging population. Though
some sources indicate there is an increase in true diabetes with
advancing age (especially over sixty years) ,13 it is uncertain whether
changes in glucose tolerance alone (the most commonly used parameter for diagnosing diabetes) indicate an emerging true diabetes
or if they are simply part of a progressive aging process. The fact
that different physicians use different criteria to diagnose the diabetic syndrome causes certain socio-economic disadvantages for the
group labeled "diabetic." The level of glucose intolerance in the
labeled group may be no worse than other individuals of the same
age who do not carry the diabetic diagnostic label. There does appear to be distinct justification for attempts to standardize glucose
tolerance values against age-matched controls. But since adultonset diabetes primarily hits at an advanced age (over sixty) and
can usually be well controlled by drugs, it is not a standard that the
employer should be legally permitted to use under the age laws.
However, true elderly diabetics who manifest some other of the
clinical or biochemical stigmata of the diabetic syndrome, in addition to a mildly impaired glucose tolerance, do appear to have agematched death rates two or three times their peers.95 This increased
mortality may not be adequately explained by the severity of diabetes (in terms of impaired glucose tolerance) or the incidence of renovascular complications. 6
92.
93.

Andres, Aging and Diabetes, 55 MED. CLiN. N. AM. 835, 844 (1971).
See Joslin & Krall, The Incidence of Diabetes, in THE TREATMENT OF DAmrfEs
MELLITUS 27-33 (10th ed. E. Joslin, H. Root, P. White & A. Marble 1959).
94. Andres, supra note 92.
95. Jackson & Winik, Hyperglycemia and Diabetes in the Elderly, in DIABETES MFUTUS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 526 (M. Ellenberg & H. Rifkin eds. 1970).
96. Pell & D'Alonzo, FactorsAssociated with Long-Term Survival of Diabetics, 214
J.A.M.A. 1833-40 (1970).
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Glucose tolerance generally deteriorates with age until about
the middle of the eighth decade. At that point, the prevalence of
impaired glucose tolerance may begin to diminish. Once past
seventy-five years, previously diagnosed diabetes may become metabolically less severe.9 7 It should be remembered that old age alone
may not lead to diabetes. There may be a dual population of elderly
hyperglycemics-one with and one without a fully developed diabetic syndrome and one with and one without all the concomitant
problems of accelerated vascular disease. More than one glucose
tolerance test may be needed if a patient is to be accurately labeled
hyperglycemic. Proper medical examination, however, requires an
evaluation of the individual and not blind acceptance of an established standard.
D. Neoplasia
While there is a pronounced increase in the incidence of cancer
with advancing age, it is not certain that this increase is related to
age alone." Many common cancer types, such as epithelial (skin,
lung and gut) tumors, rapidly increase in frequency with advancing
age. This increase begins at about twenty years of age and continues
until approximately eighty years. Other cancer types, such as acute
lymphoblastic leukemia, bone tumors, and testicular tumors, have
characteristic peak age incidences and do not increase in frequency
with advancing age. There could be a number of reasons for this ageassociated incidence increase. A long period of exposure to certain
carcinogens may be required and latent cancers may be "released"
due to impaired aspects of immunity with advancing age.9" As previously noted, some authors feel that the cancer population is a
distinct one, and incidence should not be used as a measure of the
aging-rate in a normal population.10
E.

CerebrovascularDisease

This group of diseases, loosely termed strokes, can be divided
into four categories: subarachnoid hemorrhage, cerebral hemorrhage, cerebral thrombosis and infarction, and spasm of the vessels
97. Porter & Langley, Studies in Blood-Sugar, 2 LANcET 947 (1926); see Jackson &
Winik, supra note 9.
98. Doll, Age Differences in Susceptibility to Carcinogenesisin Man, 35 BR. J. RADIOL.
31 (1962).
99. Burch, Carcinogenesisand CancerPrevention, 197 NATURE 1145-51 (1963); see Walford, supra note 47.
100. See Kohn, supra note 50.
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with other ill-defined abnormalities.1 ' One large study indicated
that stroke was the third most common cause of death in the United
States. 10 The international distribution of stroke deaths is fairly
uniform. Another study indicates that the most reliable predictor of
stroke-proneness in adults over forty years of age is pre-existing
cardiovascular disease, including electrocardiographic change, angina pectoris, prior heart attack, congestive heart failure, or left
ventricular enlargement (suggestive of hypertension or left ventricular aneurysm). Atherosclerosis rarely exists in the coronary or cerebral systems without both being involved.' Heart dysfunction predisposes the individual to stroke by giving rise to emboli from mural
thrombi"" or to cerebral ischemics from dysrhythmic episodes."0 '
Readily seen is that many of the factors relating to coronary heart
disease discussed above are also applicable to cerebrovascular disease morbidity and mortality rates.
Age-specific prevalence rates for cerebrovascular disease have
been shown to rise rapidly after age thirty-five to about a six percent
level at age seventy-five and over.'0 ' There does not appear to be
much difference between the sexes in this regard. Incidence rates as
a whole seem to increase rapidly with age, and in several series five
percent of those people eighty-five or over had new strokes each
year.' "7 It appears that past the age of thirty-five incidence may be
somewhat higher for males. Age-specific death rates for subarachnoid hemorrhage seem to remain fairly constant throughout adult
life, but the other three previously mentioned categories show logarithmic increases in age-specific death rates. The black population
seems to have an increased mortality risk from cerebrovascular disease, but this may relate to factors other than stroke itself.1 8 One
101.

Kurtzke & Kurland, The Epidemiology of Neurologic Disease, in 3 CLINICAL

NEUROLOGY, ch. 48 (A. Baker & L. Baker eds. 1973).

102.

Goldberg & Kurland, Mortality in 33 Countries from Diseases of the Nervous

System, 3 WORLD

NEUROL.

444 (1962).

103. Toole & Cole, Ischemic CerebrovascularDisease, in 1 CLINICAL NEUROLOGY, ch. 10
(A. Baker & L. Baker eds. 1973).
104. M. Wells, Anticipation of Emboli, in CEREBRAL VASCULAR DISEASES 82 (R. Siekert
& J. Whisnant eds. 1961).
105. Ferrer, The Sick Sinus Syndrome, 47 CIRcuLATION 635-36 (1973); Hutchinson &
Stock, Paroxysmal CerebralIschemia in Rheumatic Heart-Disease,2 LANCET 635 (1963).
106. Logan & Cushion, Studies on Medical and PopulationSubjects, No. 14, morbidity
statisticsfrom General Practice,Vol. I, General. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1958); Matsumoto, Whisnant, Kurland & Okazaki, Natural History of Stroke in Rochester,
Minnesota, 1955 through 1969: An Extension of a Previous Study, 1945 through 1954, 4
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107.
108.

20, 23 (1973).
See Kurtzke & Kurland, supra note 101.
Berkson & Stamler, Epidemiological Findings on CerebrovascularDiseases and

Their Implications, 5 J.
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189, 191 (1965).
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author listed six major factors relating to the risk of stroke: transient
ischemic attacks or.prior cerebral infarction, hypertension, cardiac
abnormalities, clinical evidence of atherosclerosis, diabetes mellitus, and elevated blood lipids.0 9 As with cardiovascular disease,
much of the premature mortality and morbidity might be preventable if more attention was given to preventive medical principles at
an early age. The social and scientific mystique of the central nervous system has impeded major medical advances in the clinical
neurological fields. Pathologic findings are difficult to demonstrate
antemortem, and postmortem follow-up is often lost because of family objection. Many medical institutions conduct limited autopsies,
excluding the brain from study because of the wishes of the deceased's family. Accurate epidemiological studies are even more
difficult to come by in relation to central nervous system diseases
than with many other types of illness.
F.

Neuromuscular Diseases

It is fairly common to see grouped muscle atrophy, so-called
senescent muscular atrophy, in biopsy specimens from leg muscles
of patients over sixty years old."' Proximal muscle weakness is frequent in aging subjects,"' and the pathological pattern as demonstrated from biopsy sections is not distinctly distinguishable from
the skeletal muscle wasting occurring with a number of disorders,
such as cachexia and disuse.' Advancing age seems to have deleterious effects on intramuscular motor nerve endings, and minor systemic illnesses can cause changes in the terminal axonal splays as
early as the end of the first decade of life."' Clinically it has been
noted that muscle bulk and the strength of voluntary muscle contraction generally decreases with age." 4 In addition, it is thought
that because of the decrease with age of muscle and other lean body
mass components, weight should be lost slowly after thirty years of
109. Kannel, Current Status of the Epidemiology of Brain Infarction Associated with
Occlusive Arterial Disease, 2 STROKE 295, 316 (1971).
110. Rebeiz, Caulfield & Adams, A PathologicalStudy of OculopharyngealDystrophy
(Abstracted), in SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF NEUROoOPTHALMOLOGY 76-77 (Excerpta
Medica Int'l Cong. Series No. 154, 1967).
111. Serratrice, Roux & Aquaron, Proximal Muscular Weakness in Elderly Subjects:
Report of 12 Cases, 7 J. NEUROL. Sci. 275, 295 (1968).
112. Tomlinson, Walton & Rebeiz, The Effects ofAgeing and of Cachexiaupon Skeletal
Muscle: A HistopathologicalStudy, 9 J. NEUROL. Sci. 321 (1969).
113. Woolf, The Pathology of IntramuscularNerve Endings, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF NEUROPATHOLOGY 641 (Excerpta Medica Int'l Cong. No.
100, 1966).
114. Burke, Tuttle, Thompson, Janney & Weber, The Relation of Grip Strength and
Grip-StrengthEndurance to Age, 5 J. APPL. PHYSIOL. 628-30 (1953).
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age." 5 Many older people considered to be of ideal weight may actually be overweight because of this decrease in lean body mass.
Some authors suggest that this loss of muscle bulk with increasing age is predominantly myopathic (intrinsic in etiology to the
muscle). ' Several investigators underscore the difficulties in interpreting the microscopic pathology of a given muscle biopsy as "myopathic." ' 7 In a recent clinical series using an electrophysiological
technique for the estimation of the number of functioning motor
units (the muscle fibers supplied by a single motor neuron), it was
found that there was little measurable loss of functioning motor
neurons prior to age sixty. Thereafter, there was a distinct progressive depletion. " 8 If these estimations are correct, there is an attrition
rate of approximately 3.3 percent per year from the original motorneuron pool after the age of sixty."9 Genetic and autoimmune theories of aging could be implicated here. Cohesive data on tissue culture survival of neural cells explanted from donors of varying age
and illness have not yet been published, and sampling of human
material may be particularly difficult. Certainly a multitude of extraneous factors could influence the aging process of the human
motor neuron pool.' 20
An apparent "tempering" of the motor neuron "aging process"
during the later decades is interesting, and several other clinical
parameters discussed above (such as serum cholesterol and adult
onset diabetes mellitus) show a similar characteristic. The reason
for this type of trend is not clear. It has been suggested, at least for
the motor neuron pool, that there is a "sick phase" during which
most of the obvious deleterious aging changes take place. It was
estimated that this so-called phase lasts about seven years in the
normal adult, after which time there is an apparent attenuation of
the aging process in the motor neuron system as measured by those
115. Gastineau, Obesity: Risks, Causes, and Treatments, 56 MED. CuN. N. AM. 102122 (1972).
116. Vbrzar, Muscular Dystrophy in Old Age, 1 GRoNroL. CIN. 41 (1959).
117. Drachman, Murphy, Nigam & Hills, "Myopathic" Changes in ChronicallyDenervated Muscle, 16 ARCH. NEURaOL. 14 (1967); Engel, Selective and Nonselective Susceptibility
of Muscle Fiber Types, 22 ARCH. NEUROL. 97 (1970); Kovarsky, Schochet & McCormick, The
Significance of Target Fibers: A ClinicopathologicReview of 100 Patients with Neurogenic
Atrophy, 59 AM. J. CLIN. PATHOL. 790 (1973).
118. McComas, Fawcett, Campbell & Sica, ElectrophysiologicalEstimation of the
Number of Motor Units Within a Human Muscle, 34 J. NEUROL. NEUROSURS. PSYCHIATRY 121
(1971).
119. McComas, Upton & Sica, Motoneurone Disease and Ageing, 2 LANcEr 1477-78
(1973).
120. See generally E. GuTmANN & V. HANZLIKOVA, AGE CHANGES IN THE NEUROMUSCULAR
SYSTEM

(1972).
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techniques. This is highly speculative and its applicability to other
biologic systems, let alone the motor neuron pool, is uncertain. Consequently, using age to establish neuromotor disability is legally
shaky under the age discrimination laws; the functional effects of
any measurable neuromuscular deterioration might be highly variable for any one of a number of reasons.
G.

Skeletal and Arthritic Disorders

Osteoporosis is an extremely common finding with advancing
age. 12 ' Bone loss averages about fifteen percent in most individuals
and is most severe in the trabecular bone of the major weight bearing joints. This trait predisposes the individual to traumatic fractures as age increases, particularly those involving the lower
forearm, proximal femur, and vertebrae. The osteoporotic involvement tends to be most severe in post-menopausal females, but men
over the age of seventy are affected to an increasing degree. The
precise etiology of this negative calcium balance is not known and
1 22
therapeutic regimens are of variable effectiveness.
Autopsy studies show that degenerative joint changes may
begin to appear by the second decade of life. 2 3 By age forty, ninety
percent of all people studied showed some radiographic evidence of
degenerative changes in their weight bearing joints. Radiographic
findings are generally mild under forty-five years, 24 and several authors feel that the diagnosis of osteoarthritis cannot be based on
mere radiographic evidence of joint spurring. 25 Biochemical
changes may be evident in joint cartilage by age thirty, and these
changes seem to indicate that a distinct pattern is evident in patients with osteoarthritis which does not reflect a simple extension
of "normal" age-associated biochemical changes in the joint cartilage. 26 Certain jobs lead to repetitive trauma for employees that
121. Nordin, Clinical Significance and Pathogenesisof Osteoporosis, 1 BR. MED. J. 571
(1971).
122. Hurxthal & Vose, The Relationship of Dietary Calcium Intake to Radiographic
Bone Density in Normal and Osteoporotic Persons, 4 CALcIF. Ts. RES. 245 (1969). See also
Nordin, supra note 121.
123. See generally Lowman, Osteoarthritis,157 J.A.M.A. 487 (1955).
124. Moskowitz, Clinical and Laboratory Findings in Osteoarthritis,in ARTHRIS AND
ALLIED CONDITIONS 1032-33 (8th ed. 1972).
125. Danielsson & Hernborg, Morbidity and Mortality of Osteoarthritisof the Knee
(Gonarthrosis) in Malm6, Sweden, 69 GLN. ORTHOP. 224 (1970); Danielsson & Hernborg,
Clinical and Roentgenologic Study of Knee Joints with Osteophytes, 69 CLIN. ORTHOP. 302
(1970).
126. Mankin, Biochemical and MetabolicAspects of Osteoarthritis,2 ORTHOP. CLIN. N.
AM. 19 (1971).
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initiates or accelerates symptomatic difficulties. Premature mortality is not a feature of osteoarthritis, and in the vast majority of
instances the disease itself will not be of a severity requiring early
job retirement. Many pharmacological and surgical treatments are
available to aid in alleviating pain and speeding physical rehabilita27
tion."'
Rheumatoid arthritis is a multisystem disorder more common
in females than males, characterized by remitting and relapsing
inflammation of multiple joints. 12 8 Although it becomes increasingly
prevalent with advancing age, it is unusual for rheumatoid arthritis
to lead to premature mortality. 1 9 Epidemiologic studies are difficult, as the rigidity of application of acceptable diagnostic criteria
varies among physicians and the disease itself is characterized by
remissions and exacerbations. Though feared by laymen as a great
crippler, this result does not occur in the majority of cases. Some
clinical series report that fifty percent of the patients are in improved or in stationary categories ten years after the initial diagnosis. 3 " Studies indicate that the majority of patients remain capable
of full time employment. 31 After fifteen to twenty years of disease,
only about ten percent of these -patients were fully incapacitated.
Although many forms of therapy are available for different clinical
32
stages of illness, it is essential that the therapy be individualized.1
It must be remembered that a gross anatomic deformity may not
impose much functional loss, depending on the individual circumstances.
Gout is a clinical disorder seemingly unique to humans and
characterized by both acute and chronic arthritic forms related to
the presence of sodium urate crystals in the joint. 3 3 The primary
idiopathic form of gout is predominantly a disease of adult males
and its occurrence correlates positively and distinctly with serum
127. Moskowitz, Treatment of Osteoarthritis,in ARTH~rIS AND ALLIED CONDITIONS 1054
(8th ed. 1972).
128. See PRIMER ON THE RHEUMATIC DISEASES 8 (G. Rodman ed. 1973).
129. Mikkelsen, The Epidemiology of Rheumatic Diseases 211-17, and Ragan, The
ClinicalPicture of Rheumatoid Arthritis333-40, in ARTHRITIS AND ALLIED CONDrrIoNs (8th ed.
1972).
130. See C. Short, W. Bauer & W. Reynolds, RHEUMATOID ARTHRITIS 391, Table 44.2
(1957).
131. Duthie, Brown, Truelove, Barager & Lawrie, Course and Prognosisin Rheumatoid
Arthritis, 23 ANN. RHEUM. Dis. 193, 195-96 (1964); Ragan & Farrington, The Clinical Features
of Rheumatoid Arthritis, 181 J.A.M.A. 663-64 (1962).
132. For a discussion of the different forms of therapy for rheumatoid arthritis see

(8th ed. 1972). See also Rodman, supra note 128.
Wyngaarden & Kelley, Gout, in THE METABOLIC BASIS OF INHERITED DISEASE 889

ARTHRITIS AND ALLIED CONDITIONS

133.

(3rd ed. 1972).
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levels of uric acid. Geographic factors may also influence the disease
prevalence. For example, in the Maori tribe of New Zealand, the
prevalence of clinical gout may reach ten percent in the male population.134 Several specific enzyme defects are known to lead to hyperuricemia and clinical gout, and many factors may be associated
with the occurrence of "secondary gout."' 35 A relationship between
hyperuricemia and atherosclerosis has been suggested, 3 ' but it has
been strongly questioned. 37 It does not seem that gout itself is associated with a significant premature mortality, and in the vast majority of cases proper treatment should enable individuals to con3
tinue their jobs. 1
H.

Miscellaneous

Several changes occur in the pulmonary system with advancing
years. 139 Elastin content increases, as does the size of many of the
small components of the ductal system. Thoracic wall changes include progressive calcification of the costochondral cartilages with
a slight increase in kyphosis, which leads to an increase in anteroposterior diameter. These external changes do not necessarily reflect
parenchymal lung changes. In general, vital capacity tends to decrease with age, but many patients perform noticeably better on
standard pulmonary function tests than would be predicted from
age-function curves. It is difficult to separate those aspects of deterioration in pulmonary function actually due to age from those due
to toxic effects of environmental pollutants (cigarette smoke, asbestos particles, coal dust). Presbycusis, the conductive hearing loss
often related to advancing age, may owe much of its occurrence to
environmental noise pollution. Also, many eye and ear problems are
treatable and complications preventable if called to the attention of
the appropriate medical specialist. "'
134. Decker & Lane, Gouty Arthritis in Filipinos,261 N. ENG. J. MED. 805 (1959); Prior
& Rose, Uric Acid, Gout and Public Health in the South Pacific, 65 N.Z. MED. J. 295-96
(1966).
135. See Wyngaarden & Kelley, supra note 33.
136. Dreyfuss, The Role of Hyperuricemain CoronaryHeart Disease,38 DIs. CHEST 332
(1960); Eidlitz, Uric Acid and Arteriosclerosis,2 LANCET 1046 (1961); Hansen, Hyperuricemia,
Gout, and Atherosclerosis, 72 AM. HEART J. 570-71 (1966).
137. Hall, CorrelationsAmong Hyperuricemia, Hypercholesterolemia, Coronary Disease and Hypertension, 8 ARTHRITIS RHEUM. 846 (1965); Myers, Epstein, Dodge & Mikkelsen,
The Relationship of Serum Uric Acid to Risk Factorsin CoronaryHeart Disease,45 AM. J.
MED. 520 (1968).
138. Talbott & Lilienfeld, Longevity in Gout, 14 GERIATRICS 409, 415-18 (1959); Talbott
& Terplan, The Kidney in Gout, 39 MEDICINE 405, 415, 447 (1960).

139. Richards, Pulmonary Changes Due to Aging in 2 HANDBOOK OF PHYSIOLOGY 1525
(1965); see D. Bates, R. Christie & P. Macklem, RESPIRATORY FUNCTION IN DISEASE (1964).
140. See 2 SYSTEM OF OrTHALMOLOGY (S. Duke-Elder ed. 1961). See also 9 id. at 663-75
(1966); 10 id. at 517-28 (1967); 11 id. at 10-16 (1969).

19741

AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS

Performance on a wide variety of cognitive tests appears to
deteriorate with age, but these deficiencies are difficult to interpret
in terms of establishing a cognitive profile for the aged.' These
tested deficiencies may vary greatly with many external and internal factors, including the test arrangement itself.12 Indeed, tests
showing a decreased intelligence in an aging population must be
interpreted with great care and the circumstances of the testing
situation critically analyzed (testing will be subsequently considered). Job performance problems for individuals may not be related
to aging but rather to the accumulation of diverse and unmanageable responsibilities. While motivation, or a lack thereof, may be one
important factor for the aging employee, there are so many factors
interwoven between the medical and psychological spheres that separating them is a staggering job.
THERAPEUTIC ALTERATION OF THE AGING PROCESS

A variety of methods for slowing the aging process have been
somewhat over-zealously proposed in the past-such as yogurt, animal gonad transplantation to man, cytotoxic serum, body freezing
techniques, and others.4 3 Most well-documented data do not substantiate human life-spans beyond 110 to 120 years.'44 There have
been some claims of life-spans around 160 years among the Abkasians (residents of the Caucasus), but the accuracy of these reports
is highly questionable.' As mentioned above, most of the increase
in life expectancy over the last several hundred years is in terms of
the mean, not the maximal, life expectancy; the characteristic oldest age has not changed markedly. Even if the treatment of known
human cancers were successful, total mean life expectancy would
probably only be increased by about two years.' Perhaps seven
more years could be added if premature coronary heart disease were
eliminated.'4 7 To initiate any true alteration of the characteristic
oldest age, however, more information must be collected about the
aging process. In terms of the aging laws and retirement plans, this
141. Botwinick & Thompson, Practice of Speeded Response in Relation to Age, Sex,
and Set, 22 J. GERONTOL. 72 (1967).
142. Furry & Baltes, The Effect of Age Differences in Ability-ExtraneousPerformance
Variables on the Assessment of Intelligence in Children, Adults, and the Elderly, 28 J.
GERONTOL. 73 (1973).
143. See Hayflick, supra note 62.
144. McKain, Are They Really That Old? Some Observations ConcerningExtreme Old
Age in the Soviet Union, 1 GERONTOL. 70 (1967).
145. Leaf, Every Day is a Gift When You Are Over 100, 143 NAT'L GEOG. 93 (1973).
146. See R. KOHN, PRINCIPLES OF MAMMALAN AGING 110 (1971).
147. See Hayflick, supra note 62.
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alteration might not be important unless the quality of life is improved at the same time. As a side effect of increasing life expectancy, political pressure would be exerted to protect workers past 65
and to raise the age of compulsory retirement.
There is not much information on the pharmacological control
of the rate of human aging.' While caloric restriction in rats leads
to a longer life-span, it is not entirely certain how this principle
applies to man.'49 Superficially, this experimental data gathered
from rats would seem to conform to the old "rate of living" theory
where life-span was felt to be inversely proportional to the rate of
energy expenditure.' 50 Fish (poikilothermic animals) have been
shown to have increased longevity when reared at lower ambient
temperatures;"' rats (homeothermic animals) have a decreased lifespan under similar circumstances."12 Experimental data may not be
comparable as regards longevity in poikilothermic and homeothermic animals. Castration does not seem to have a distinct effect on
the life-span of mammals." 3 While antitoxidants might be expected
to alter aging changes produced by free radicals, experimental effects of antioxidants are so far somewhat less than striking."4 It has
been suggested that pharmacologic tests could be performed on in
vitro cultured human cell lines to evaluate drug effects on cellular
life-spans and hopefully to provide information applicable to an
entire organism."' Experiments employing freezing techniques indicate that life can be temporarily suspended under certain conditions
but picks up with the same rate of aging at the same age when
thawed. The use of procaine hydrochloride remains controversial."8
In summary, there is no distinct mechanism currently known for
slowing the aging rate in man.
INDUSTRIAL MEANING

There is little doubt that the current mean age of death reflects
148. Bender, Kormendy & Powell, PharmacologicalControl of Aging, 5 Exp. GEOoROL.
97-98 (1970). See Goldstein, supra note 63.
149. McCay, Chemical Aspects of Aging and the Effect of Diet Upon Aging, in
PROBLEMS OF AGING 139 (1952).
150. See R. PEARL, THE RATE OF LIVING (1928).
151. Liu & Walford, Observations of the Lifespans of Several Species of Annual Fishes
and of the World's Smallest Fishes, 5 ExP. GERONrOL. 241, 243 (1970).
0
152. Johnson, Kintner & Kibler, Effects of 48 F. (8.9°C.) and 83F. (28.4°C.) on
Longevity and Pathology of Male Rats, 18 J. GERoNTOL. 29 (1963).
153. See Comfort, supra note 47, at 180-81.
154. See Harman, Prolongationof Life: Role of Free Radical Reactions in Aging, 17 J.
AM. GERIAT. Soc. J. 721 (1969).
155. See Goldstein, supra note 63, at 1125.
156. See Bender, supra note 148.
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a vast number of environmental interactions, most of which are not
understood. Before man can fully comprehend his own "aging process" he will better need to control the environmental factors affecting his mortality (for example, coronary heart disease, viral diseases, nuclear power). In this respect a major role can be played
on the part of preventive medicine. Thus far, unfortunately, this
role has been sadly understated and underpracticed by the general
public and medical profession.
Though man may stumble on a magic elixir dramatically extending his functional stay on earth, some of the mysteries of aging
will need to be unraveled by the experimental scientist in the laboratory. This must be accomplished before large-scale meaningful
attempts can be made towards slowing the aging process. Perhaps
all of "physiologic aging" is related to as yet unidentified environmental factors, and given a proper test-tube environment we could
live forever. This does not sound aesthetically pleasing at this time,
and certainly is not in sight for the near future.
In regard to the earthier problem of employability for the fortyto sixty-five-year age group, there would seem to be better predicators of morbidity and mortality in this group than chronologic age
itself. Closer cooperation is needed between industry and medicine
to make accurate and ethical decisions regarding the employability
of individuals in particular jobs. Based on available data, it has
been determined that the costs of hospitalization increase only
slightly with age.' 7 Some employers prior to 1967 used the added
cost of hospitalization benefits provided by collective bargaining as
an excuse not to hire older workers.'58 Since the added cost is slight,
however, employers should not be permitted to point to medical
data to excuse refusals to hire older workers. In fact, even before
1967 it had been established under state workmen's compensation
laws that age had little impact on the costs of providing medical
insurance benefits.'59 Although the physical infirmity of the worker
may be strained by labor, workmen's compensation benefits have
not been denied.' 0 Age does not increase the probability of accident
even though heart, circulatory and other diseases figure prominently in workmen's compensation claims.
157. G. SHATrO, EMPLOYMENT OF THE MIDDLE-AGED 156 (1972).
158. LABOR REPORT, supra note 13, at 47-49.
159. G. SHAro, supra note 157, at 170-80.
160. Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich. 635, 83 N.W.2d 603 (1957); Sheppard v. Michigan
Nat'l Bank, 348 Mich. 577, 83 N.W.2d 614 (1957); Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 36 N.J. 487,
178 A.2d 161 (1962); Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish and Insulation Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d
761 (1958).
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UNIONS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION

Prior to the Railway Labor Act,'"' the terms of employment
were usually fixed on an individual basis with the employees hired.
Union membership increased and collective bargaining supplanted
individual negotiation in the railroads after 1926. The Wagner Act
was passed in 1935, thereby increasing union growth and collective
bargaining in most industries operating in interstate commerce."'
The act requires employers to bargain in good faith with union
representatives over wages, hours and other conditions of employment.'6 3 This good faith bargaining requirement brought about certain concessions and accommodations. Agreements were made
whereby employers not only relinquished considerable authority
over hiring, promotion, and retention, but also provided pensions,
insurance, and other fringe benefits. While not mentioned in the
Wagner Act and the subsequent amending legislation, the duty to
bargain in good faith over these various conditions was so broadly
interpreted in prior cases'6 4 that it was inevitable that age would be
considered in the agreements. This broad posture allowed employers
complete discretion, in the absence of antiunion motive, to hire,
discharge, promote, or assign workmen as they saw fit, but agreements made with unions tempered the unilateral power of employ65
ers.'
The hiring hall was contracted for in the construction, maritime, and other industries, and the average age of employees was
influenced by the fact that members of long standing were entitled
to preferential treatment. Unions traditionally exhibit interest in
promoting and protecting older members,'66 and the hiring hall often
benefited older members.16 7 In fact, there is no evidence that hiring
halls have ever been operated to the disadvantage of older members.
Employers obligating themselves to hire through a hiring hall could
161. Ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, 45 U.S.C.).
162. 29 U.S.C. § 151-66 (1970).
163. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a); see McMullans v. Kansas, 0. & G. Ry., 129 F.
Supp. 157 (E.D. Okla. 1955).
164. See generally NLRB v. Cranston Print Works Co., 258 F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1958);
NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935
(1954); Logan Mfg. Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 1586 (1967); Borg-Warner Corp., 128 N.L.R.B. 1035
(1960); Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 456 (1954); Shields Eng'r. & Mfg. Co.,
85 N.L.R.B. 168 (1949); Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948).
165. Consolidated Welding and Eng'r Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 739 (1964); Blue Plate Foods,
Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1953).
166. W. DONAHUE & C. Tis3rrrs, POLITICS OF AGE 148-50 (1971); LABOR REPORT, supra
note 13, at 54.
167. B. SCHNEIDER, THE OLDER WORKER 7 (1962).
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be held responsible for either contractual violations or unfair labor
practices if they refused to hire older, but qualified, members referred by the union. To some extent the hiring hall agreement prevented employers from equating age with physical incapacity so
long as the referred were able to do the job.
Younger members, here defined as forty years of age or under,
generally view the world differently than the older members who
provide the leadership in the union.' 8 The attitudes of these older
members were shaped by the 1930 depression and World War II,
while younger members knew prosperity, the Korean and Vietnam
Wars, and civil rights showdowns. For example, pensions are of less
concern to younger than to older members. If the current median
age of union membership drops, the union goals to be achieved
through collective bargaining might also change, and because older
members can hinder the opportunities of younger members, union
leaders could be forced to shift priorities as the median age is lowered.' 9
Before the age discrimination laws there was some possibility
that if younger members were unfairly represented, unfair labor
practice charges could be successfully prosecuted or unions decertifled under the Taft-Hartley Act. For example, when black employees were harassed by unions prior to the enactment of state and
federal fair employment laws, the NLRB and the courts found unfair representation'7 or violations of section 8(b) .171 It seems possible
that the NLRB could entertain age discrimination claims against
unions grossly overprotective of older members. It should be remembered that while the federal age discrimination law is not related to
the Taft-Hartley Act, congressional policy has been declared protecting older workers. Under these circumstances, the NLRB is not
likely to ignore claims of age discrimination when interpreting the
Taft-Hartley Act. In fact, the 1967 legislation indicates that the
NLRB must be more aware of age discrimination than in the past.
Without turning to the NLRB, employers who fail to comply with
168.

R. MILLER, F. ZELLER & G. MILLER, THE PRACTICE OF LocAL UNION LEADERSHIP 76

(1965).
169. Too OLD TO WORK-ToO YOUNG TO RETI 4 (1960).
170. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892
(1955) (per curiam); Turnstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1951); Mitchell v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 91 F. Supp. 175 (N.D.
Ala. 1950); Hall v. Louisville & N.R.R., 26 L.R.R.M. 2468 (W.D. Ky. 1950); Hughes Tool Co.,
104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
171. Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); South Tex. Produce Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
1442 (1946), aff'd sub nom., NLRB v. Whittenburg, 165 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1947).
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the terms of their agreement can also be sued for damages under
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act." 2 The Supreme Court has interpreted section 301 as creating a new federal right,"' and suits can
be brought in a state or federal court for breach of contract 74 or
unfair labor practice charges brought before the NLRB.
Now that the alternative remedies available under the TaftHartley Act have been established, some of the contractual devices
utilized by unions to protect older members will be reviewed. Before
the Wagner Act, unions attempted to contractually limit employer
control over the work force in order to minimize discrimination
against union members. After the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts,
union leaders shifted their goals by negotiating agreements limiting
the employer's ability to make decisions. For example, while rightto-work states can outlaw all forms of union security, hiring hall job
referral is legal in all states if it is stipulated in the contract. To
maximize retention and promotion probabilities, seniority clauses
that favor older workers are emphasized by unions.' The vast majority of collective bargaining agreements specify some form of seniority in considerations for promotion, layoff and choice of shift.'
Grievances over referrals and seniority can be brought before an
arbitrator.
The seniority clause also raises some disadvantages for employees because it limits their ability to test its legality under age discrimination laws. 77 This contractual protection appears fair for
older workers serving the same employer since it serves as a reward
for long and faithful service. For older workers seeking employment
or the newly hired, however, the seniority clause poses a major hurdle. Since large employers are more likely to contractually provide
for seniority than small employers, older unemployed workers generally experience less difficulty securing suitable employment in
178
small firms which do not bargain with unions.
Even in the absence of a seniority clause, employers are ex172. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
173. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
174. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). Note that the state court must apply federal law.
175. See, e.g., Price v. Teamsters Union, 457 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1972); Evans v. United
Transp. Union, 80 L.R.R.M. 2016 (N. D. Ala. 1970).
176. H. DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTrVE BARGAINING 228-36 (3d ed. 1972).
177. Like all rules of thumb, exceptions are possible and some seniority agreements
might be voided under an age discrimination law. For example, departmental seniority is
more common than job or plant seniority, which holds down opportunity for members in one
department because there is less layoff and greater opportunity in another department.
178. LABOR REPORT, supra note 13, at 60.
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tremely reluctant to promote or train older workers. 79 Employers
claim that such training of older workers is inefficient and costly
because the time actually spent in the new job is limited. Unions
often question employer decisions denying opportunity to members
and turn to arbitrators to protect older workers. Furthermore, if
agreements are negotiated to permit early retirement, arbitration is
utilized if employees are retired against their will.'80 Grievances are
also brought before arbitrators pursuant to the "just cause" provision when employers claim that older employees were released for
inefficiency and age.' Even before the enactment of the age laws,
however, some arbitrators felt that age was not "just cause" for
discharge.8 2 They took the position that employers discharging
older employees must clearly prove the inefficiency of the worker.
Arbitrators also felt that the age of grievants does not bar training
or promotion. 3 While the arbitrator had discretion in preventing
age discrimination, 4 generally only unilateral and factually unsup5
portable age policies adopted by employers were made taboo.'
Arbitrators disagreed whether or not age limits for job trainees were
"factually unsupportable." Some felt that a maximum age limit
could be fixed by employers if it was reasonable and the jobs entailed considerable training.' Although views of reasonable age
179.

F. & E.

ELKOURI,

How

ARBITRATION WORKS

607-08 (3d ed. 1973).

180. See generally Honeggers' & Co. v. Teamsters Local 90, 71-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS
3703 (1971); A.O. Smith Corp. v. Smith Steel Workers, Affiliated Local 19806, 66-1 CCH LAB.
ARB. AWARDS 4038 (1965).
181. White Motor Co. v. Machinists Lodge 804, 65-2 CCH LAB. ARa. AWARDS 5711
(1965).
182. Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. Steelworkers Local 2701, 57 Lab. Arb. 237, 25152 (1971); United States Steel Corp. v. Steelworkers Local 2227, 55 Lab. Arb. 659, 662-63
(1970); Scott Paper Co. v. Pulp Mill Workers Local 11, 67-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 4627
(1967); National Coop. Refinery Ass'n v. Oil Workers Local 5-558, 44 Lab. Arb. 92 (1964);
Louisville Pub. Warehouse Co. v. Teamsters Local 89, 29 Lab. Arb. 128 (1957).
183. Municipal Authority v. Utility Workers Local 416, 70-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS
3528 (1969); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Steelworkers Local 4347, 28 Lab. Arb. 557
(1957).
184. Cf. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Steelworkers Local 1272, 29 Lab. Arb. 532
(1957). In New York, age standards for apprenticeship in the sheet metal trades are 18 to 23.
See SOVERN, RACiAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 865 (1973). It should be noted that this
seems to violate the New York age discrimination law (see Table I) and the federal law.
185. See generally Ozark Smelting & Mining Div., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Oil Workers Local 5-609, 66-2 CCH LAB. ARm. AWARDS 4490 (1966). With age discrimination laws, the
arbitrator should not follow the terms of an agreement calling for age discrimination.
186. Aro, Inc. v. Air Engineering Metal Trades Council & Affiliated Unions, 52 Lab.
Arb. 372 (1969); Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Steelworkers Local 1187, 47 Lab. Arb. 88 (1966);
Ozark Smelting & Mining Div., Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Oil Workers Local 5-609, 46 Lab.
Arb. 697 (1966); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Long Shoremen's Local 142, 37 Lab. Arb. 553
(1961); Sutherland Paper Co. v. Independent Union of Sutherland Paper Co. of Employees,
25 Lab. Arb. 716 (1955).
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limitation varied, some arbitrators were reluctant to endorse age
limitations.18 1 Other arbitrators, without expressed legislative guidance, found employers responsible for violating collective bargaining agreements by setting age standards. 88' As the Supreme Court
clearly specified in GardnerDenver,'8 arbitrators are not required
to follow legislation or court interpretation.
Certain rulings by arbitrators are reviewed. For example, when
an eligible thirty-year-old candidate for a job was rejected because
the collective bargaining agreement called for preference for the
senior bidder,"' the arbitrator correctly felt that the age limitation,
preferring younger employees, imposed by the employer was unreasonable. If the age limitation imposed by the employer is reasonable, the senior bidder is without recourse."' In making his decision,
the arbitrator did not mention two significant factors. First, permitting an employer to establish age limitations when senior employees
bid for jobs changes the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Does an arbitrator exceed his authority by interpreting the
contract so as to permit change? Section 301 endorses the sanctity
of the contract and requires the arbitrator to follow terms as specified. By reading an age limitation that is not present into a contract,
the arbitrator frustrates the right of the union to protect the senior
man. By making such an interpretation, the arbitrator actually aids
the employer seeking to circumvent the age discrimination laws.
Secondly, while employers may amicably greet seniority for considerations of layoff, recall, and choice of shift, reliance on seniority to
determine promotion and job training is repugnant to them. Unless
the contract gives employers the right to establish age limitations,
it would seem that endorsement by arbitrators is questionable under
the Steelworkers trilogy and the age laws. However, this view is less
than gospel. If the agreement is silent and there is no evidence
pertaining to the use of age limitations for promotion or job training,
arbitrators could rule that the employer holds implied authority.
Such a construction means that the courts would favor the arbitrator's decision, permitted under the Steelworkers cases without judicial review.
There is another factor, medically reviewed in a previous sec187.

Kovarsky, Civil Rights and Arbitration, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 59.

188. Ball Bros. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Local 88, 46 Lab. Arb. 1153 (1966); Ciba
Pharm. Co. v. Chemical Workers Local 9, 41 Lab. Arb. 14 (1963).
189. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
190. Ball Bros. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Local 88, 66-2 CCH LAB. ARm. AwARDs 5097
(1966).
191. See also United States Plywood Corp. v. Woodworkers Local 5-317, 67-2 CCH LAs.
ARB. AWARDs 4852 (1967).
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tion and supported by the age discrimination laws, that somewhat
reflects a lack of insight on the part of some arbitrators. As breakthroughs are made by medical science, more people will live for
longer periods of time even though they may experience serious
ailments. Due to these medical advancements, less people are debilitated with medical problems and more are capable of matching the
performance of younger people. Arbitrators and employers tend to
forget too often that motivation on the job, as in athletics, can
overcome many deficiencies. A more sensible approach is for arbitrators to support contracts without exception by awarding the opportunity to the senior bidder and completely removing age as a
factor.'9 2 Admittedly, senior bidders sixty years of age, who must be
trained for two years and who retire at sixty-five, are not good
choices for promotion and training. Few at this age, however, seek
a new challenge or willingly transfer to another job where previously
accumulated seniority may be lost. By adopting this recommendation, employers can still present evidence to arbitrators that senior
bidders are physically or mentally disabled. In this fashion, the
arbitrator is in accord with the age discrimination laws requiring
employers to evaluate the individual. While a cost would be attached to the medical testimony required to help arbitrators determine the capability of the job bidders, such costs are justifiable if
older workers are to be protected. If unions are unwilling to share
in the arbitration and evidentiary costs, they can advise the grievants to seek a legal remedy. Whether proceeding to court or arbitration, the cost to employers could be considerable.
A less agonizing but similar question often taken to arbitration
is whether employers can unilaterally retire all employees reaching
sixty-five years of age. The problem can become more complicated
if employers single out employees for retirement on an ad hoc basis.
While employers may claim that a management prerogative clause
authorizes the unilateral establishment of a retirement age,"9 3 arbitrators have supported the grievants by finding a breach of the job
tenure provisions of the agreement.'
Some arbitrators, however,
support the notion that employers do not act arbitrarily by estab192. Scott Paper Co. v. Pulp Workers Local 11, 67-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 4627
(1967).
193. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). In this
case the Supreme Court ruled that a vague management rights clause does not give the
employer the right to skip arbitration.
194. Consolidated Packaging Corp. v. Machinists Lodge 131, 68-2 CCH LAB. ARB.
AWARDS 4501 (1968); H.K. Porter Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 170, 67-2 CCH LAB. ARB.
AWARDS

4982 (1967).
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lishing a reasonable but compulsory retirement age.' 95 Arbitrators
espousing this position accept the universal standard that sixty-five
years of age is a reasonable retirement age. From a medical viewpoint, sixty-five years may be a fair retirement age because of a
more rapid physiological breakdown after sixty years of age.
Whether employers should be allowed to fix even a reasonable retirement age is still a controversial question, especially when this
age is less than sixty-five. Consequently, an investigation of recent
decisions by arbitrators does not disclose a retirement age that
would be classified as reasonable. Since some of the collective bargaining agreements permit or require retirement at sixty, it seems
that the unilateral selection of this age by employers might be reasonable. Furthermore, state and federal laws sanction bona fide
compulsory retirement plans prior to the age of sixty.' 8 Yet, sixty
could still be considered unreasonable where employees are fit and
retirement unwanted.'97 There is probably more reason to exercise
caution when employers fix the age of retirement than if a public
agency makes the decision.
Grievances are taken to arbitration where the physical capability of grievants are questioned. Arbitrators are reluctant to sanction
the discharge of employees who have slowed down but are still physically capable and the age discrimination laws support this position.
While arbitrators would be hard-pressed to support grievants obviously unable to handle their jobs, they could support those who
perform satisfactorily even if they are physically incapacitated. Testimony before arbitrators as to the physical infirmity of workers is
frequently conflicting, and the philosophy expressed in the current
laws tips the scales in favor of grievants. Some arbitration awards
pertaining to physical ability are now reviewed. If temporarily disabled, an employee who is warned of inadequate performance cannot
be improperly discharged.'9 8 This position has been taken by arbi195. Service Tech. Corp. v. Laborers Local 313, 72-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 4207
(1972); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Local 59, 70-2 CCH LAB. AR. AWARDS
4997 (1970); Cook & Brown Lime Co. v. Teamsters Local 126, 68-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDs
4617 (1968); Brickles, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 1059, 65-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDs 5577
(1965).
196. See discussion pertaining to retirement infra.
197. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n., 33 Lab. Arb. 84 (1959). Note that
the Federal Aviation Agency today regulates air carrier pilots and it has determined that 60,
because of safety factors, is the mandatory retirement age. Note, however, that the 60-year
retirement age was established by a public agency authorized to regulate air carriers and
provide for the public safety. See Bergman, Age Discriminationin Employment: Air Carriers,
36 J. AIR L. & COM. 3 (1970). The question of compulsory retirement for air pilots at 60 will
be considered again when the federal age discrimination law is reviewed.
198. City Prods. Corp. v. Teamsters Local 743, 65-2 CCH LAB. ARH. AWARDS 5302
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trators even when the temporarily disabled employee adds to the
costs of production.'90 While the age discrimination laws do not call
for the protection of those permanently disabled and unable to perform satisfactorily, they probably do protect those permanently and
temporarily disabled who can do the job. As employees age, however, the period of recovery is often longer than for younger workers.
Does an employer violate the age discrimination laws by discharging
older workers who mend slowly? While arbitrators could uphold the
right of employers to insist that temporarily disabled employees
stop working, with or without pay, discharge could be seen as a sign
of age discrimination. Some arbitrators have even ruled that discharged workers permanently disabled should be assigned to jobs
they can perform. 0 Arbitrators are careful to emphasize the fact
that the employee must be capable of handling another assignment.2"' If the employer discharges those close to retirement without
seeking an alternative solution, the age laws could be interpreted to
forbid discharge leading to a loss of benefits.
THE FEDERAL AGE LAW
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION

Prior to Congressional action, the states enacted legislation to
(1965). This type of question, temporary disability, is not mentioned in the 1967 law forbidding age discrimination. Arbitrators in this type of situation interpret the "just cause" provision of an agreement so that a ruling is proper that temporary disability is not "just cause"
for discharge. The 1967 law does not require an employer to retain an employee temporarily
incapable of doing the job, but it could be argued that discharging such an employee is
evidence of age discrimination, especially if no attempt is made to place him elsewhere, and
the employee has been with the firm a considerable length of time. For awards similar to that
made in City Products Corp. see General Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers Union, 72-2
CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 4601 (1972); Douglas & Lomason Co. v. Industrial Workers Local 669,
68-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 5238 (1968); Magnavox Co. v. Industrial Workers Local 254, 46
Lab. Arb. 719 (1966); Barth Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Mine Workers Local 482, 42 Lab. Arb.
374 (1964); A & P Co. v. Bakery Employees Local 262, 41 Lab. Arb. 278 (1963); Columbia
Packing Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 31 Lab. Arb. 152 (1958); Management Servs.
v. Oil Workers Local 9-439, 26 Lab. Arb. 505 (1956).
199. Shahmoon Indus. v. United Steelworkers, 42 Lab. Arb. 392 (1963); Laher Battery
Prod. Corp. v. UAW Local 76, 11 Lab. Arb. 41 (1948).
200. Silas Mason Co. v. Machinists Lodge 1010, 72-1 CCH LAB. ARn. AWARDS 4027
(1972); Anemostat Controlair Corp. v. Sheetmetal Workers Local 170, 50 Lab. Arb. 1277
(1968); United Brick & Tile Co. v. Glass Workers Local 142, 62-3 CCH LAB. Ann. AWARDS 5761
(1962); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Steelworkers Local 2478, 25 Lab. Arb. 214 (1955);
Sylvania Electric Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 25 Lab. Arb. 407 (1955); Republic Steel
Corp. v. Steelworkers Local 3670, 25 Lab. Arb. 238 (1955).
201. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Oil Workers Local 3-693, 67-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 5002
(1967); Riegel Paper Corp. v. Pulp Workers Locals 738 & 797, 66-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS
4522 (1966); Western Elec. Co. v. Communication Workers Union, 42 Lab. Arb. 1316 (1964);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Steelworkers Local 1383, 42 Lab. Arb. 137 (1964); American Oil Co.
v. Oil Workers Local 124, 62-1 CCH LAB. Ain. AWARDS 4284 (1962).
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meet the needs of older workers. In 1903 Colorado became the first
state to enact an age discrimination law and it was followed by
Louisiana in 1934 and Massachusetts in 1937.02 These laws existed

prior to the extensive development of administrative law and violations were enforced by criminal proceedings. Few age charges were
brought into the courtroom under the early laws.2 11 Not only was it

more difficult to establish guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, but
employees unprotected by unions feared being black-balled and few
would risk offending employers. A second era began in 1950 when
Massachusetts placed the regulation of its age discrimination law
under the control of an administrative agency. 24 Other states soon
followed the Massachusetts lead in placing the administration of
their laws under agency control. See Table I.
In enacting the 1967 age discrimination legislation, Congress
drew upon a multitude of state and federal laws and experiences to
fashion a federal bill. One source for banning age discrimination was
the agreements negotiated by employers and unions that were enforced under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act and interpreted by

arbitrators. 25 While there had been some sentiment to amend the

unfair labor practice provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act to outlaw
age discrimination,2

this approach would have meant that age dis-

crimination violations, prohibited by contract, could be arbitrated
and that the NLRB could entertain unfair labor practice complaints.2

7

Another early source was an executive order, similar to

the one forbidding government contractors to engage in racial and

religious discrimination,2 8 that prohibited discrimination on the
basis of age. 21 There is no evidence that any government agency

enforced this executive order and as a matter of fact no enforcement
agency was ever designated.
Because of state age laws and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,20
there was some support for placing control of the federal age dis202.

8 LAB. REL. REP., FAIR EMPLOY. PRAC. MANUAL § 451, at 182, 491, 559.
203. To date, California, Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska, and North Dakota
provide that the aggrieved or attorney general can bring a civil or criminal action. See CAL.
LABOR CODE § 1422 (West 1971); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 80-21-7 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-9927
(1974); LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:892-93 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1008 (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 34-01-17 (1972). The method of enforcement of the law in Ohio is not indicated. See OHIO
REV. CODE § 4101.17 (Anderson 1973).
204. 8 LAB. REL. REP., FAIR EMPLOY. PRAc. MANUAL 451:559 (1974).
205. Beatrice Foods v. Machinists Lodge 1127, 71-1 CCH LAB. ARm. AWARDS 3254 (1970).
206. B. SCHNEIDER, THE OLDER WORKER 74 (1962).
207. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n., 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
208. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
209. 8 LAB. REL. REP., FAIR EMPLOY. PRAC. MANUAL 421:207-08 (1973).
210. 92 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
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crimination law with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.). Congress, however, placed the regulation of the
1967 law in the hands of the Department of Labor."' The Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor was later charged with
failing to enforce the age law; a similar charge had been leveled
against the Department of Labor for not enforcing contracts prohibiting racial discrimination.2 12 As of 1969, there were less than 1,000
enforcement officers in the Wage and Hour Division devoting less
than ten percent of their time to age discrimination complaints; the
equivalent of less than 100 enforcement officers devoted full time to
the age complaints. As late as 1971, Senator Rudolph of West Vir21
ginia claimed that the law was not being enforced satisfactorily. 1
Due to this continuing criticism of the Wage and Hour Division, it
is possible that the administration of the law may, at some future
date, be turned over to the E.E.O.C. Even though it is not specifically authorized to investigate age complaints, the E.E.O.C. has
been receiving them. 4 In fact, Congress considered the inclusion of
a ban against age discrimination when the Civil Rights Act of 1964
was debated.2 1 5 When the 1964 legislation was enacted, however,
section 715 only authorized the Secretary of Labor to undertake a
2 16
study of age discrimination.
As shown in Table I, the federal legislation contains a savings
clause so that "any State performing like functions" can adjudicate
complaints with the exception that "action under this (federal) Act
. . . shall supersede any State action. ' 21 7 The federal law prohibits
suit "before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been
commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been
earlier terminated ....
,218 This law differs from the state laws in
several respects. Many of the state laws empower an administrative
commission to make a binding decision. An agency must conciliate
before making a binding decision or else suit must be brought ab
initio in court under other state laws. While the federal law author211. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§ 5-7,29 U.S.C. §§ 624-26 (1970).
212. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Retirement Incomes of the
Special Comm. on Aging, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 9, at 1178-79 (1969).
213. Hearingson S. 555, 1307, 1580 Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the Comm. on
Laborand Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 59 (1971). For a review of the investigations
made, see DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT AcT OF 1967, 2-4 (1972).

214. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1965, at 36, col. 2.
215. Hearingson H.R. 405 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Education
and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 22, 38-39, 92, 430, 478-79 (1963).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1970).
217. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1970).
218. Id, § 633(b).
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izes the Secretary of Labor to attempt conciliation through the
Wage and Hour Division, a binding decision cannot be made. If
conciliation is unsuccessful, the Secretary of Labor can press
charges against the firm or union in a federal district court. The
Secretary of Labor cannot by-pass conciliation-it
must be under29
taken before turning to a federal court.
In contrast, the Iowa age legislation delegated to the Iowa Civil
Rights Commission the authority to make decisions and to issue
cease and desist orders. 2 1 Investigation and conciliation are the initial steps under the Iowa legislation, followed by a public hearing if
necessary. As in the racial complaints, the investigation and conciliation attempts must be kept confidential until the public hearing
stage. However, under Iowa law the commission decision is not enforced, and a full hearing is held in a state court on appeal if necessary. Since the Wage and Hour Division can only conciliate, proceedings in a federal court are de novo. Iowa also adds a dimension
not found in most of the other state and federal laws. Discrimination
at all ages is prohibited, while most other state laws and the federal
221
law only apply to discrimination from forty to sixty-five years.
Even though no ages are designated, however, it seems unlikely that
the Iowa law protects minors. The Iowa law also bars discrimination
where "the physical or mental condition of a person. . . constitutes
a substantial handicap, but is unrelated to such person's ability to
engage in a particular occupation. ' ' 22 While the federal law does not
mention physical or mental handicap, it might be possible for the
handicapped in some instances to equate their disability with age
and establish a federal violation. For example, many elderly persons
with a mildly progressive senile or presenile dementia can satisfactorily continue to perform their jobs. This ability can be equalled
by those who have had certain types of strokes. Moderately severe
degenerative joint disease might also have little effect on the employee's ability to function well in sedentary work. Depending on
individual circumstances, many mechanical and intellectual functions can be performed satisfactorily with moderate dysfunctions of
eyesight and hearing. With the help of prosthetics, medicines, vocational rehabilitation, surgical, environmental, and other scientific
219. Id. § 626(b). See Brennan v. Weis Markets, 5 F.E.P. Cases 850 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
220. The Iowa law could not be immediately enforced because the State legislature did
not provide funds. In fact, Iowa, in 1970, amended its fair employment laws to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, which, by 1973, had not been funded.
221. See Table 1. It can be anticipated that few charges will be considered in Iowa
before 21 years of age and after 65 years of age.
222. IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(11) (Additional Supp. 1974).
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innovations, those over forty with physical and mental handicaps
can satisfactorily fill many jobs. If the physical or mental disability
is not age related, however, the federal law might not control even
if the complainant performs satisfactorily on the job. In Iowa and
states with similar legislation, those with a physical or mental handicap unrelated to age can successfully seek redress.
States with age discrimination laws have the first opportunity
to remedy violations if "like functions," as specified in the federal
law, are performed by these states. Section 636(b) of the federal law
permits recourse to the Department of Labor "before the expiration
of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the
State law." A question likely to be considered carefully in the future
is the meaning of "like functions." For example, if a state merely
encourages the elimination of age discrimination without making it
illegal, must the Department of Labor defer to the state? Since the
state law is without teeth, there would seem to be little reason for
the Wage and Hour Division to hesitate; the state law is clearly
without "like functions." This problem was considered in Goger v.
H. K. Porter Co., 2 where the plaintiff claimed the right to by-pass
the state remedy by bringing suit under federal law because only
discrimination in hiring, and not discharge, was forbidden. The
federal court decided that the New Jersey law forbade discharge,
but did not expressly review the meaning of "like functions" of the
federal law. The court concluded:
It is true that the Act does not require an aggrieved to exhaust state remedies
as a condition precedent ... but it clearly requires that a complaint be made
to the appropriate state agency ....

The State must be given a threshold

period of 60 days in which it may attempt to resolve the controversy, normally
by voluntary compliance ....
2

This decision can be challenged in light of the "like functions"
specified in the federal law. If the New Jersey law is without "like
functions," immediate recourse to the Wage and Hour Division
seems proper. It is unlikely that the court implied, without discussion, that the New Jersey law contained "like functions." Employers operating in interstate commerce are subject to federal regulation and the propriety of requiring notification to the state needs
explanation.
Where the "functions" are substantially "alike," however, asking for immediate federal relief is improper. 225 For example, the
Pennsylvania state law forbids discrimination to sixty-two while the
223. 5 F.E.P. Cases 695 (D.N.J. 1973).
224. Id. at 697.
225. McGarvey v. Merck & Co., 359 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1973).
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federal law forbids discrimination to sixty-five. If a plaintiff was
fifty-nine years of age, there would be no reason to permit immediate recourse under the federal law because this difference is not
substantial, and does not take away from the "like functions" of the
Pennsylvania law. If our hypothetical Pennsylvania plaintiff was
past sixty-two years of age, there would not be "like functions" and
only the Wage and Hour Division could attempt to resolve the dispute. The federal and state laws are similar in the respect that they
blanket private employers, unions, and employment agencies, exempting public agencies, and applying to hiring, promotion, and
discharge. A few states-California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, and Ohio-do not specify
who is covered nor are there specific exclusions. While there is some
variance, most of the states and the federal law create exceptions
when there are bona fide retirement and insurance plans. Colorado
is one state in which the law applies only to discharge and not to
hiring-or apparently promotion.
Under section 4(f) (1) of the federal law, 22 8 age discrimination is
legal, as it is under state laws, "where the differentiation is based
on reasonable factors other than age . . . ." It is apparent that
"reasonable factors" will require considerable interpretation by the
Department of Labor and the courts and differences of opinion will
inevitably arise. Based on the medical data previously reviewed, the
use of abstract standards to establish physiological aging is not
acceptable. To establish disability, the individual must be physically or mentally evaluated without recourse to potentially misleading probability statistics. It is essential that complaints be encouraged at the present time, not only to aid older workers but to explore
and establish the meaning of "reasonable factors" and other unknowns. Perhaps at some future time medical breakthroughs will
permit screening standards so that the capability of each individual
employee need not be determined individually. For the time being,
however, it seems proper to follow the policy already adopted by the
Wage and Hour Division in limiting the number of bona fide excep227
tions .
The meaning of "reasonable factors other than age" is obscure,
but in most instances it should be geared to the individual and not
the firm. Technically speaking, the employer can turn away a job
candidate for unreasonable factors if unrelated to age. Thus, if the
226.
(1970).
227.

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 4(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)
29 C.F.R. § 860.102(b) (1973).
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word "reasonable" is included as a standard to guide decisionmakers, was the challenged decision made on age or other "factors?" If "reasonable," the Wage and Hour Division and the courts
should attach greater credibility to the other "factors." Unreasonable "factors" not only cast doubt upon the intentions of employers
and unions, but are also against the law.22 8 It should be noted that
while the federal law does not necessitate intentional age discrimination, there are some state laws where intentional discrimination
does appear to be a prerequisite.
Employers can use a wide variety of personnel tools such as
medical examinations and aptitude, ability, and intelligence
tests.22 Courts accept testing that is not intentionally or inherently
discriminatory where there is little reason to believe that such use
violates the federal age law as unreasonable "factors other than
age." Tests that are not geared to job description, validated, and
checked for reliability can discriminate against older workmen. The
viewpoint that age leads to personality changes which seldom affect
performance on the job would probably follow congressional intent
since elder legislators are naturally sympathetic to older workers in
industry. Intelligence tests may unfairly measure older workers
since they are more likely to have fewer years of schooling than
younger workers and to be further removed in time from formal
learning. 20 Given the current state of the art, there is considerable
doubt as to whether native intelligence can be measured-what is
measured is acquired knowledge and the ability to take tests.13' In
contrast, it can be reasoned that the most important elements for
success on the job are experience and motivation. Unless an intelligence test can predict motivation or ability to learn, the test score is
not that significant. For example, older job seekers may be more
highly motivated because of the fact that employment opportunities
disappear with age. In fact, holding a job or granting a promotion
can eliminate personality changes in older and depressed workers.
228. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
229. Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Practical
Application, 24 BAYLOR L. Rxv. 601 (1972).
230. This was a factor in Duke Power Co., convincing the Supreme Court that Title VII
was violated because blacks average less years in school than whites and are exposed to an
inferior education. Thus, the effect of the employers testing policy was to discriminate against
black workmen.
231. "New Chicago Plan Ordered," 4 RACE REL. REP., Nov. 19, 1973, at 1. The Urban
League accused unions of relying on "rigid age and educational requirements" to screen out
blacks from employment opportunities. As older workers typically have less years in school
than younger workers-this is true for black and white-intelligence test scores for all older
workers should be lower than for younger workers.
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Such an interpretation would be well received in federal district
courts since judges are up in years and also naturally receptive.
As previously indicated, personality changes with age and tests
could be used to screen out older employees. Since complaints have
not been registered by older people, employers using personality
tests appear secure. 2 While little of scientific merit is known about
personality testing, some are used for research or diagnostic purposes and others are used for selection in industry. Some personality
tests are prepared without designating norms while others carefully
delineate norms that reflect the bias of the selectors.3 Many clinical psychologists and psychiatrists feel that personality tests are not
a proper industrial tool?4 and those attempts made to validate personality tests for industrial use have not been convincing. One particular reason for this lack of success is the fact that there are no
right or wrong answers in these tests. 23 Furthermore, to properly
assess personality, intellectual ability and background must be
taken into account. 231 The claim that advancing age leads to serious
inroads in mental capacity or psychiatric disorder is doubtful in the
absence of other physiological changes, even though "[t]he EEG
findings . . . suggest that the electrical activity of the brain undergoes change with age, regardless of whether detectable physical disease is present or not. . . ...
2
As indicated previously, changes
tend to occur in those sixty years of age and over. The EEG is a very
general medical tool that must be looked at in light of the population sampled and the type of abnormality present.
In general, fewer activities are pursued as a person ages and
such people are more interested in solitary activities. 23 Due to these
changes and the threat of a new generation, tests are viewed with
trepidation by older people.?" While those holding professional and
232. In relation to the extent that age discrimination in employment is commonplace,
few complaints are being registered with the Wage and Hour Division. Complaints should
increase as large awards, such as that recently imposed against Standard Oil of California,
are imposed. Furthermore, unlike the E.E.O.C., the Wage and Hour Division does not have
investigatory power-it can only act when a complaint is registered. Some of the states with
age discrimination laws have delegated the power to investigate to commissions.
233. THE SIXTH MENTAL MEASUREMENTS YEARBOOK 58, at 142-47 (Buros ed. 1965).
234. Lovell, The Human Use of PersonalityTests: A Dissenting View, 22 AM. PSYCH.
383, 387 (1967).
235. HUMAN AGING 103, 204 (S.Chown ed. 1972).

236. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HUMAN AGING:
BEHAVIORAL STUDY 153 (1963) (Pub. Health Serv. Publ. No. 986).
237.
238.

Id. at 311.
H. GEIST, THE

IMPLICATIONS

239.

A

BIOLOGICAL AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE AGING PROCESS WITH SOCIOLOoGICAL

50 (1968); H. JACOBS, YOUTH LOOKS

H. GEIST, supra note 238, at 60.

AT AGING

6 (1969).
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managerial positions should be least affected by age, personality
tests tend to be used most frequently at these levels.2 4 While age
may affect vision, hearing, and touch sensitivity, experience can
compensate for such low-level losses. The question of a test score
and seniority has gone to arbitration.2 4' Without mentioning the
1967 age discrimination law, the arbitrator favored the employer
who selected an employee for a job with less seniority because the
worker with greater seniority was older and scored low on an aptitude test. The arbitrator permitted this result without examining
the validity of the test. Because of the Steelworkers trilogy2 2 and
other Supreme Court decisions, 243 the arbitrator's decision cannot be
questioned and legislation need not be considered when making an
award.2 4 It is possible, however, that workers of all ages can be
evaluated by the same intelligence and aptitude tests. 245 While disadvantaged when tests are prepared to favor younger workers, older
workers are usually less affected by intelligence, verbal, numerical,
and space perception tests than by finger dexterity and similar per26
formance tests. 1
One aspect of the age discrimination laws that has not been
explored is the right of employees to bid for jobs laterally, or downward, rather than upward. Since complaints are made only upon
hiring and promotion failures or compulsory retirement, neither
state nor federal laws and regulations cover this possibility. 2 7 The
248
federal law only bars segregation or the limitation of opportunity,
and Congress seemed unconcerned with employees interested in
less-taxing or perhaps more personally satisfying jobs. Yet there is
240.

G.

241.

North Am. Refractories Co. v. Brick Workers Local 448, 68-1 CCH

MARBACH,

JOB REDESIGN

FOR OLDER WORKERS

20 (1968).
LAB. ARB.

AWARDS 3732 (1968).
242. United Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
243. United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 358 (1971) (Harlan,
J., concurring); NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969); NLRB v. Acme Ind. Co., 385 U.S. 432
(1967); United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, Inc., 384 U.S. 424 (1966); John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Truck Drivers Local 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517
(1963).
244. According to Gardner-Denver,however, there is no election of remedy if proceeding
under Title VII after an arbitrator's award.
245. Duke Power Co. seems to indicate that the test must be designed for the job, geared
to job description, and must not discriminate against a group who takes the test and who
faces disadvantage.
246. H. GEIST, supra note 238, at 58-59; G. MARBACH, supra note 240, at 17.
247. Such a question has gone to arbitration. See Overhead Door Co. v. Carpenters
Local 2047, 70-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 3691 (1969).
248. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1970).
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little doubt that many older employees, particularly after children
are grown, would welcome jobs with less physical or mental strain.
The question thus arises as to whether refusals by employers to
honor lateral or downward bids constitute evidence of age discrimination when openings are available."' If employees are forced to
accept early retirement and downward bids are denied, employers
should be held responsible for violating the federal age law. While
the retirement plan may be "bona fide," it should not be used as a
means to force retirement when alternatives are available. On the
other hand, if employees are physically incapacitated or lack the
necessary skills, or if the employer advances some other satisfactory
reason, employers turning down job transfers should not be held
responsible for age discrimination. Without "reasonable" explanations, however, employers should be made legally responsible. The
burden of proof should be placed on the employer who refuses a job
shift to show that he is not discriminating.
While seldom resorting to the Taft-Hartley Act to protect older
members, unions do negotiate seniority clauses, contractual clauses
reserving specific jobs and a reduced workweek for aging members,
as well as hiring-hall agreements, which entitle older members to
referral preferences.21 The federal age discrimination law protects
the "bona fide" seniority plan,25 ' but does not mention the hiring
hall and other contractual preferences. If an agreement calls for
shift or hiring-hall preference for those over fifty years of age, workers between forty and fifty would be at a disadvantage. Agreements
giving preference to those over fifty years of age are unquestionably
valid under the Taft-Hartley Act, but legitimacy under the age laws
is less certain. It can be reasoned, however, that those over fifty need
more protection than is legally provided and that the agreement
must follow the spirit, if not the language, of the age laws. The
collective bargaining agreement should be acceptable even though
the age laws call for equal protection for those forty to sixty-five
years of age. Congress apparently does not favor additional court249. While such a dispute can be decided by an arbitrator when the collective bargaining agreement calls for arbitration, the union and not the employee decides whether the
grievance should be taken to arbitration. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Some
agreements provide that the wages and hours of employees are to be adjusted due to physical
disability or age. See Borden Foods Co. v. Teamsters Local 563, 46 Lab. Arb. 1175 (1966).
When the employer refuses to honor the agreement, he could be brought before an arbitrator,
sued under § 301 for not honoring his agreement, or charged with an unfair labor practice,
not bargaining in good faith, before the NLRB. But whether the 1967 law could be applied is
uncertain.
250. B. SCHNEIDER, THE OLDER WORKER 23-31 (1962).
251. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1970).
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created exceptions to the federal legislation other than those specified in the act; the "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the operation of the particular business" points to such
a conclusion. 2 2 To allow contractual exceptions to the 1967 legislation for those over fifty cannot be considered "reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business ....,,23 Whatever validity there is to this type of a contractual arrangement has
to be considered on the basis of the needs of older workers and not
strictly by business needs.
This problem poses two major questions:
1. Since the Taft-Hartley Act does not bar agreements authorizing age preferences, is it impliedly amended by the federal age
discrimination law if such preferences are ruled violative of congressional intent? Unions or employers insisting on extending
greater protection to workmen than called for in the 1967 legislation could be cited for bargaining in bad faith and violating
section 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3). If not a legitimate bargaining goal,
such an agreement could not be enforced under section 301, but
it might still be brought to arbitration. If these agreements do
not contradict the federal age law or if the federal age law need
not be read into the Taft-Hartley Act, then such bargaining is
in good faith and the agreements can be enforced under section
301.
2. Should the Wage and Hour Division and the courts permit
greater protection by collective bargaining agreements for the
older worker than presently permitted under the 1967 legislation? This question not only involves congressional intent, but
also considerations of whether workmen over fifty need such
additional protection.
It is unlikely that such a contractual bonus qualifies as a "bona
fide" exception, because it is unrelated to "occupation" and is not
likely to qualify as being "reasonably necessary to the operation of
the business." Should humanitarian employers unilaterally favor
those over 50, the courts might be more suspicious than where negotiated by agreement. Yet to view suspiciously an employer helping
those over fifty seems far-fetched.
An additional consideration is the effect of state laws upon
employers operating in interstate commerce. The federal and state
laws could be differently interpreted, raising questions of federal
252. Id. § 623(f)(1).
253. Id.
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preemption. Through the savings clause, the 1967 law does protect
a state law which gives greater protection to workmen than the
federal law. Suppose, however, that the federal age law is interpreted to outlaw the agreement but it is ruled valid under the Iowa
age law. The Taft-Hartley Act supersedes other labor legislation
enacted in Iowa and there is no savings clause in the Taft-Hartley
Act to protect such an agreement. In accordance with Lincoln
Mills,25 the federal law of contract preempts state law because of
the need for uniform regulation. Again, the NLRB and the courts
could rule that the 1967 age legislation impliedly amends the TaftHartley Act. Based on the Borg-Warner25 bargaining categories, an
agreement violating the 1967 legislation is unenforceable under the
Taft-Hartley Act. To uniformly regulate employers and unions, the
NLRB, the Wage and Hour Division, and the courts must reach the
same conclusions irrespective of the fact that they operate under
different laws and procedures.
Society could also benefit if arbitrators were forced to follow the
same rules, but the Steelworkers trilogy and the Gardner-Denver
case rule out this goal. There are, however, at least some arbitrators
5 For this
who still feel compelled to follow the federal age law.2
reason, decisions of arbitrators are more uniform than might be
imagined.2 7 Since most arbitrators are legally trained, they do tend
to look at the decisions of other arbitrators even though they do not
cite such precedent in their awards. Since lawyers often represent
the contestants at the hearings, there is an additional push toward
uniformity.
The federal preemption of the Wisconsin age discrimination
law by the Taft-Hartley Act was considered prior to 1967. The question was raised in Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial
8 where an employer had the option
Commission,2
of retiring an
employee between sixty and sixty-five years of age with ten years
of service. The lower court found that the employer violated the
Wisconsin age law by exercising the contractual option and claimed
federal preemption, pointing to sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the
Taft-Hartley Act. Differing with the lower court, the Wisconsin
254. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
255. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
256. See Mead Corp., 59 Lab. Arb. 789 (1972).
257. See generally Westerkamp & Miller, The Acceptability of Inexperienced Arbitrators: An Experiment, 22 LAB. L.J. 763 (1971); Report of the Federal Mediation & Conciliation
Service, 1958, 82 Mo. LAB. REv. 408, 410 (1959).
258. 57 L.R.R.M. 2553 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1964), af'd, 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307
(1965).
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Supreme Court ruled that the Taft-Hartley Act did not signal a
congressional intent to preempt the state age law and turned to the
following three Supreme Court opinions to support its ruling:
21
Garmon,29 Oliver20 and ContinentalAir lines. 1
In Garmon, the demand made by the union for a union security
agreement barred by a state right-to-work law was deemed to be
grounds for an unfair labor practice charge as regulated by the
NLRB. Justice Frankfurter provided the guidelines missing in the
Taft-Hartley Act with the following markers:
1. If the federal interest is "peripheral" rather than direct,
state regulation is appropriate.
2. If there is a deep-rooted state interest not clearly superseded
by federal legislation, state regulation is appropriate.
Deciding when the federal interest is direct and not peripheral is
often difficult. Justice Frankfurter in Garmon must have known
that his guidelines would raise future cliff-hangers.2 12 Yet, where
Congress fails to delineate direction, the Supreme Court is virtually
obligated to provide some direction. To avoid making a decision by
throwing the question back to Congress would have been even more
disruptive than the broad guidelines offered by the Court.
In Oliver, which preceded Garmon, the Supreme Court ruled
that since the federal interest in regulating competition under the
Sherman Act was paramount to state interest, any state regulation
was improper. While there was some question of the propriety of
regulating unions under the Sherman Act, 2 3 the Supreme Court felt
that it was improper to invoke a state law to control wage agreements negotiated between the union and an employer operating in
interstate commerce. In ContinentalAirlines,2 4 the Supreme Court
decided that, in the absence of federal fair employment legislation,
Colorado properly enforced its fair employment law against an air
259. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
260. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
261. 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
262. For other decisions not cited by the Wisconsin Court see Retail Clerks' Local 1625
v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963); Plumbers Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); International Union UAW
v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); United
Const. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 303 F.2d 428 (1962), rev'd, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
263. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
264. 372 U.S. 714 (1963). See also Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945)
(upholding the constitutionality of the New York Civil Rights Law against the claim of federal
preemption).
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carrier operating in interstate commerce. 25 Expounding the majority view, Justice Black felt that the Colorado statute did not in any
way frustrate the federal purpose as spelled out in both the Railway
Labor Act and Taft-Hartley Act. While the state and federal interest in containing racial discrimination should be equal or near
equal, the primary factor was that the Railway Labor and TaftHartley Acts, for the most part, could only be utilized to reach union
discrimination.2"' Consequently, federal regulation was less satisfactory than regulation under the Colorado fair employment law.
Relying on this precedent, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
that the "test is whether enforcement of the state act would frustrate the objectives of the particular federal act which allegedly has
preempted the field, 27 and concluded that the federal purpose was
not thwarted because, as in Continental.'irlines, a federal law prohibiting age discrimination had not been enacted. Whatever interference that existed with sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(1) and (2) of the
Taft-Hartley Act was considered to be only peripheral. If the 1967
law was in effect, the savings clause would still permit Wisconsin
regulation. Even today, it would seem that the regulation of age
discrimination under the Taft-Hartley Act is peripheral and Wisconsin regulation should be permitted. The NLRB could still entertain unfair labor practice charges and representation decertification
petitions where the foundation of the complaint is age discrimination. What might develop is an election of remedy issue if a complaint is adjudicated by the NLRB and a dissatisfied party then
seeks relief under a state or federal age discrimination law." 8
SPECIAL

A.

TYPES

OF WORKERS

Airlines Pilots

While adherence to the federal laws protects the employer and
265. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877) and Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946),
in which state laws pertaining to passengers, rather than employees, burdened interstate
commerce.
266. See Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
267. Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307 (1965).
268. For the position of the NLRB regarding arbitration rather than a Taft-Hartley
remedy see NLRB COUNSEL, ARBITRATION DEFERRED POLICY UNDER COLLYER-REVISED
GUIDELINES 17 (1973). For similar situations involving an election of remedy, i.e., seeking a
remedy under Title VII after an award by an arbitrator, see the conflicting opinions in Dewey
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) and Hutchings v. United States Indus.,
Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970). This issue was before the Supreme Court in GardnerDenver. See also Barry v. Flint Fire Dep't, 83 L.R.R.M. 2173 (Mich. App. 1973), in which
the court decided that when the question is one of constitutional rights, it is proper to turn
to the courts rather than the grievance procedure.
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union from age discrimination charges, it may require industries
like the commercial airlines to hire older employees (those over
forty) even if long periods of training are necessary. Since pilots
require several years of training and must retire at sixty, airlines
might well reason that it is uneconomical to train pilots over forty
years of age. This policy seriously hinders the efforts at finding
civilian employment for pilots retired from the military after twenty
years of service. It should be noted that the F.A.A. has not fixed any
cutoff age governing the hiring or promotion of pilots and the courts
to date have not ruled on the legitimacy of such a policy for airlines.
Several states, Colorado, Delaware, Illinois, Michigan, New
Jersey, and Wisconsin, specifically permit or indicate that age discrimination is proper when reasonably necessary to fill jobs and
when the cut-off age is reasonable. The federal law, section 4(f) (1),
legalizes discrimination "if reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is
based on reasonable factors other than age." Since federal law protects only those forty and over, carriers could refuse to hire pilots
thirty-five years of age; under Iowa law, which prohibits all age
discrimination, it would be illegal. This creates a conflict of regulation problem for air carriers 26 9-legality under federal law and potential illegality in states such as Iowa. While it could be argued
that the Iowa law unduly burdens interstate commerce, the success
of this position is not likely because employment, and not the carriage of passengers, is the issue as evidence by the savings clause in
the federal age law.
For pilots retiring from the military, two related problems
exist-the interpretation of state laws protecting those under forty
years of age and state and federal laws protecting those over forty
years of age. 0 Section 4(f)(1) permits "bona fide occupational"
exceptions if necessary to employer operation or if there are "reasonable factors other than age."27 ' The regulations of the Department
22
of Labor provide that age is not a determining factor in hiring.
Since pilots fly until sixty, the F.A.A. or a carrier would be hardpressed to produce evidence that hiring pilots over forty years of age
creates a hazard. If an exception is to be permitted, it would have
269. See, e.g., Colorado Anti-Discrim. Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S.
714 (1963).
270. For a discussion of retirement benefits for commercial pilots see notes 343-44 infra
and accompanying text. See also Bergman, Age Discriminationin Employment: Air Carriers,
36 J. AIR L. & COM. 324-27 (1970).
271. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1970).
272. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c) (1973).
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to be based on the business necessity rationale that training pilots
over forty is uneconomical. Admittedly, passenger carriage by air is
in need of uniform regulation and a serious question exists whether
state regulation should be permitted. There is no apparent reason,
however, why the Iowa law should not apply at the hiring level
because it would in all probability be seen as a strengthening of the
federal law.
B.

Firemen and Policemen

The federal age discrimination law did not initially include
state employment.2 73 Unless there was a collective bargaining agreement and/or a state law pertaining to state employees, firemen or
policemen claiming age discrimination had to look for protection to
a peripheral federal law or constitutional right. The federal law,
however, was amended in 1974 to outlaw age discrimination by any
state agency.274 Under section 15(b) of the 1974 amendments, federal
policemen and firemen (and all other federal employees) can complain of age discrimination to the Civil Service Commission (but not
the Wage and Hour Division). As an ultimate remedy, the complainant has a right to bring suit in a federal district court.
In one such suit involving both age and racial discrimination,
the plaintiff, a black, brought suit against the Minneapolis Fire
Department under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871275 and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 276 At the time
of the suit, the Minneapolis Fire Department was entirely white and
the state of Minnesota had not outlawed age discrimination. The
Minneapolis Civil Service regulations provide that those seeking
employment as firemen must be less than thirty years of age, unless
they are veterans of the Armed Forces. Not only were the 19th
century laws applicable, but the court found an equal protection
violation on the grounds that there was no compelling reason to
favor veterans over non-veterans on the basis of age. The court,
however, failed to indicate whether a cut-off age of thirty for all fire
department applicants would be unreasonable under the fourteenth
273. B.N.A. 401:5004 (§ 11(b)).
274. Note that federal employment remains excluded under the 1974 federal amendments.
275. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and presumably § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
passed by Congress under the auspices of the thirteenth amendment. Section 1 guarantees
freedom of contract to the black and a denial of public employment is tantamount to a badge
of servitude. The thirteenth amendment is applicable to private and public employers.
276. See Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626 (D. Minn. 1971).

19741

AGE DISCRIMINATION LAWS

amendment. Since the training period for a fireman is not lengthy,
it is possible that the fourteenth amendment could be invoked
against an unreasonable cut-off age where the complainants are
27
black.
8
For example, in Barry v. Flint Fire Departmentt2
a collective
bargaining contract requiring that anyone seeking promotion to
equipment supervisor must have more than two years of remaining
service before retiring was ruled unconstitutional under the
fourteenth amendment. This contractual provision was not part of
the Civil Service regulations or law and it had been ignored in some
promotions, an important factor according to the court. 5 Notably,
the two-year service requirement was not labeled unreasonable, and
even if it had been fixed by law or civil service regulation, the
fourteenth amendment would be satisfied even though such laws
and civil service regulations can easily be changed. This is a troublesome feature in the Barry opinion. While laws are sometimes difficult to change, regulations are often easier to change than the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement. It seems that the court in
Barry did not advance substantial reason to support its opinion.
A thirty or thirty-five year cut-off age is not physically justifiable. The training period for firemen and policemen is short and
Herculean efforts are not required in many of the departmental jobs.
The age standards for firemen and policemen were established
many years ago and have remained unchanged in spite of recent
medical information and advanced technology. A few decisions are
reported that dwell upon the special circumstances under which
firemen and policemen operate. These decisions are relevant to the
established cut-off age for hiring. Presumably, physical standards
for firemen and policemen are higher than in other occupations, and
age is relied upon as a rough barometer of physical fitness. Physical
standards, especially those at the hiring stage, are higher than in
most occupations. The physical demands placed upon a firefighter
277. The fourteenth amendment equal protection proviso has been used to reach sex
discrimination in employment. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Sail'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). But whether the Supreme
Court would consider the fourteenth amendment as controlling in age discrimination disputes
is an open question. See also cases cited note 344, infra, involving the F.A.A. regulations
requiring retirement at 60 for airline pilots.
278. 44 Mich. App. 602, 205 N.W.2d 627 (1973).
279. The Flint Fire Department claimed that the 2-year minimum service rule was
established to protect the pension funds and to justify the costs of promotion due to the
inevitable inefficiency of learning the new job. Michigan has an age discrimination law
covering the 18 to 60 year age span that applies to public employment. Effective in 1974, the
federal law would also be applicable.
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may be greater than upon policemen since a firearm can be a substitute for physical strength on the police force. In fact, physical standards for policemen have been lowered and women are being hired
with less physical strength than men. The physical fitness standards
for athletes are greater than for firemen and policemen. An aging
athlete finds that while his strength does not noticeably deteriorate,
his legs and speed are less than what they used to be. The person
over fifty years of age who is physically fit can hold his own as a
fireman or policeman even though his speed and agility are reduced.
What seems to be important in these jobs is not the age of those
hired but their physical fitness. A regulation demanding physical
fitness makes more sense than blindly equating age with physical
capability. Such a regulation would follow the spirit of the age discrimination laws by focusing upon the physical capabilities of the
individual. Until 1974, those over forty could not contest the thirty
to thirty-five age standard under the federal law. In states, such as
Iowa, that bar all age discrimination, the cut-off age could be classified as unreasonable.
While no decision has been found testing the maximum hiring
ages for firemen and policemen under a state age law, the maximum
hiring age of thirty-five was indirectly challenged in Pierce v. Fort
Wayne Board.28 The plaintiff was forty-two years of age when hired
and was discharged at forty-seven. He contended that the Indiana
law forbidding age discrimination between forty and sixty-five was
violated. Taking a circuitous route to uphold the discharge, the
Indiana Supreme Court said:
Pierce [the plaintiff] was not discharged because he was between 40 and 65
years of age. He was discharged because he was over 35 years of age when he
was appointed to the fire force. We reach this conclusion as a matter of law; it
is the only reasonable inference flowing from the evidence. Pierce was not
discriminated against because he was 47 years of age. He was discharged
because . . . (the Indiana law) prohibits appointments to the fire force of a

person over 35 years of age.7'

Especially since the plaintiff was a dispatcher and not a fire fighter,
the court should have questioned, or at least considered, the hiring
age limitation. 2 2 Although the dissenting judge did not cite medical
data, he felt that thirty-five years was a reasonable hiring age for
firemen due to the physical demands of the job. He took the position, however, that thirty-five years was not reasonable for adminis280.
Ind. App. -,
292 N.E.2d 857, petition for transfer denied, 301 N.E.2d 842 (1973).
281. Id. at -,
292 N.E.2d at 858.
282. See 301 N.E.2d at 842 (Hunter, J., dissenting).

Ind.

-,
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trative and maintenance employees. No evidence has been found
that police or fire departments establish lesser standards for administrative personnel and this factor casts a longer shadow upon the
age standards adopted for these public employees throughout the
United States.
A somewhat similar question was raised in McIlvaine v. The
Pennsylvania State Police,m where the plaintiff, a sixty-year-old
police captain, was forced to retire pursuant to a Pennsylvania law
requiring all policemen to retire upon reaching the age of sixty unless they have served less than twenty years. The plaintiff claimed
a violation of both the Pennsylvania law outlawing age discrimination between forty and sixty-two and the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
The lower court supported the defendant for the following reasons:
1. The rule permitting policemen to continue on the force after
sixty-two to complete twenty years of service was reasonable in
order to ensure adequate pension benefits.
2. A compulsory retirement age at sixty is both necessary and
reasonable due to the strain of police work. The trial judge
stated:
The fact that a particular police officer is physically fit and able to perform
his duties or that minds may differ upon the particular mandatory retirement
age selected by the legislature is not proof of want of bona fides as to qualification otherwise applied uniformly. . . to the selected class.24

Unlike interpretations of the federal age law, the trial court in
McIlvaine did not shift the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its retirement policy to the defendant.25 A concurring judge
did feel that the defendant should justify the disparity of requiring
retirement at sixty-two with more than twenty years of service while
permitting those with less than twenty years to continue to work. If
those with less than twenty years of service continue to work past
sixty-two, it indicates that they are physically able to handle the
job. It is more difficult under such circumstances to support a compulsory retirement policy at sixty-two merely because the employee
has more than twenty years of continuous employment.
The dissenting judge felt that the defendant had not sustained
the burden of proof to justify a bona fide exception. Since the plain283.
284.
285.
Airways,
Tel. Co.,

6 Pa. Cmwlth. 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972), aff'd, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973).
Id. at 512, 296 A.2d at 633.
For cases showing federal policy under Title VII see Diaz v. Pan American World
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell
408 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969).
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tiff was sixty years of age, the state should have been required to
show that he was incapable of continuing in his job. The plaintiff's
position as a police captain was not physically demanding and his
long years of service were an asset. The dissenting judge also felt
that the plaintiff's need for employment and the state's need for
police efficiency must be balanced. Because the plaintiff was physically and mentally qualified, the defendant was easing the difficulty
of making decisions by following a fixed retirement rule not medically justifiable. As stated in the dissenting opinion:
Under the equal protection test which should ... apply, the classification
must demonstrate a "significant relationship" to the legislative purpose.
Where such a relationship ... exists, it must be balanced against the nature
of the class thereby disadvantaged ....
There is no showing that age is significantly related to [the plaintiff's] . . . performance of his duties as a troop
commander.2'

While the F.A.A. regulations governing pilots emphasized public
safety, the majority appellate opinion in McIlvaine did not stress
this factor. They simply ruled that physical fitness did not alter the
bona fide quality of a retirement plan uniformly followed. This
point will be considered again when pension plans are evaluated.
Many state laws protecting public employees are inapplicable
because discrimination against those under forty is not barred.
These states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington and West Virginia. However, there could still be a violation of the equal protection clause if the complainant is under forty. Alaska, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, New Hampshire and Oregon bar all age discrimination in public and private employment and a cut-off age of thirty
or thirty-five must be justified. Medically, it will be difficult to
defend this cut-off hiring age as a bona fide exception and it can be
anticipated that more civil service hiring and compulsory retirement regulations will be tested constitutionally in the future. Civil
service age standards frequently do not protect the public and
should not be considered more sacrosanct than age standards established by private employers.
C. Bus and Truck Drivers
While truck drivers haul freight, bus drivers are responsible for
the safety of passengers. The Interstate Commerce Commission is
286. 454 Pa. at -,
309 A.2d at 811 (Roberts, J., dissenting). It should be observed
that such a construction could jeopardize many retirement and pension plans under or over
65 years of age, plans which the state and federal laws tend to legitimize.
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responsible for the physical standards set for truck drivers while bus
drivers are under the control of the Department of Transportation.
Even though truck drivers are not closely supervised, the Department of Transportation requires entry and physical examinations
every two years until fifty years of age and yearly thereafter. 7 To
protect the public safety and regulate the national highways, the
federal government properly sets standards for bus drivers, trucking
firms, and passenger carriers under the commerce clause.2 88 Because
of special problems and the need for uniform regulation, it is possible to argue that drivers should not be controlled by either state or
federal age discrimination laws. While most of these laws do not
single out an industry for special attention, bona fide employment
exceptions could be permitted for truck and bus carriers differing
from other industries that are not so closely regulated. With possible
state and federal regulations as well as collective bargaining agreements applicable, questions of federal preemption and the proper
regulatory vehicle are raised. The stringent standards set by the
Department of Transportation are not likely to be questioned under
an age discrimination law because the physical condition of the
individual bus driver is being checked and a neutral agency protecting the public sets the standards. Regulation by the Department of
Transportation is similar to regulation by the F.A.A. What is more
likely to be questioned under an age law are those employment
standards imposed by companies and unions.
Two decisions concerning bus drivers have been made under
the federal age law. 9 In Hodgson v. Tamiani Trail Tours, the defendant refused to hire bus drivers over forty years of age, stressing the
need for public safety and claiming that a "bona fide occupational
qualification [was] reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the . . . business," as specified in section 4(f)(1). Ruling in favor
of the defendant, the court cited the Duke Power Co.290 decision
which stated:
The Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was
formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority
group ....
What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
287. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230, 233 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Adm., Ch. III, § I, § 391 et seq. (1972).
288. Because public funds have been given to states to build roads, because of concepts
of national defense, because of interstate commerce considerations, etc., there is a federal
right to provide regulations governing highway safety.
289. Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill., 1973), rev'd, 7
F.E.P. Cases 817 (7th Cir. 1974); Hodgson v. Tamiani Trail Tours, 4 F.E.P. Cases 728 (S.D.
Fla. 1972).
290. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
21
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification. '

The Court also said:
The Act prohibits not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity.
If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.212

Because the tests had not been properly validated as required by the
E.E.O.C. and the need for high school diplomas had not been established, the defendant was found to be responsible for unfair employment under Title VII without evidence of intentional discrimination.
Following Duke Power Co., the district court in Tamianistated
that "(t)he touchstone for a B.F.O.Q. exemption . . . is a finding
that age is a reasonablerequirement, necessitated by normal business operations and having a manifest relationship to the employment in question. ' '293 The court felt that the defendant bears the
burden of establishing both the need for a cut-off hiring age of
thirty-five and the fact that public safety was promoted by this
policy. The court in Tamiani also felt that it was impractical for the
employer to weigh the physical fitness of each employee and permitted the adoption of a reasonable policy to protect public safety. The
court accepted the testimony of an expert witness that forty was a
reasonable maximum hiring limitation for bus drivers because of
factors such as declining vision, slowdown of motor reflexes and
decrease in stamina. The finding of reasonableness was also influenced by the fact that new bus drivers were assigned to the least
desirable and most taxing runs and that the choice runs were determined according to seniority. The district court concluded:
The general nature of a motor bus operation, the exclusive trust and reliance
put upon a single driver . . . and the strict requirements imposed upon a
carrier fox qualification, training and monitoring a driver are all indistinguishable from ... requirements imposed upon airlines ....211

The district court placed greater reliance on the need for public
safety than appears to be warranted by medical data. It should be
noted that the hiring age was fixed by the employer and not by a
public agency. If medical data warranted the restriction of hiring to
those under thirty-five, it would seem that the Department of
Transportation could have provided the necessary guidance. Fur291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 431.
4 F.E.P. Cases at 730.
Id. at 733.
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thermore, declining vision can be corrected by glasses, and the mandatory medical examinations every year or two assure periodic testing of reflex action. While disabilities are not always detected by
examination, vision and motor reflex action can be tested with accuracy."9 5 While motor reflexes, in the context of quick reactions, are
not generally checked in routine physical examinations, either the
Department of Transportation or the employer could insist that this
be done.
The lower court decision in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 2
is not reconciliable with the Tamiani decision. Greyhound employs
more than 9,500 bus drivers and has a policy of not hiring candidates past thirty-five years of age. Relying on section 4(f) (1) and the
need for public safety, the defendant was not certain why thirty-five
years was adopted as the point of entry. Consequently, the burden
of establishing the need for its age policy was shifted to the defendant who claimed:
1. The safety record of the company is evidence of the success
of its policy.
2. Medical technology has not progressed sufficiently to detect
accurately disabilities in those over forty years of age.
3. Drivers with less than ten years of seniority are classified as
extras, and not assigned to a regular run which is grueling for
older drivers.
4. Interstate drivers with the best safety records have served
sixteen years or more. Thus, it is not economically feasible to
employ those more than thirty-five years of age. This approach
constitutes a business necessity argument as specified in Duke
Power Co.
One factor weighing in favor of the plaintiffs was the disagreement among expert witnesses as to the reliability of physical examinations. One medical expert testified that after forty years of age
"degenerative changes occur. . . such as arteriosclerotic changes in
the blood vessels, the heart, the blood vessels in the brain, the
kidneys, the lungs, his lower extremities and his visual capacity or
295. There may be some difference in opinion concerning the rate of decline in the speed
of motor impulses. The slowdown in sensimotor activities due to age varies with the person,
but this slowdown may be partly due to caution and a lack of motivation rather than physiological aging.
296. 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. 111.1973). For further discussion of the lower court position
see J. BIRREN, R. BUTLER, S. GREENHOUSE, L. SOKOLOFF & M. YARRow, HUMAN AGING: A
BIOLOGICAL AND BEHAVIORAL STUDY 38-45 (1963); H. JACOBS, YOUTH LOOKS AT AGING 4-6 (1969);
G. SHATro, EMPLOYMENT OF THE MIDDLE-AGED 148-51 (1972).
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7
sensory changes including a decrease in his ability to see at night."
Some heart conditions are not easily detected by electrocardiogram,
even in those appearing to be likely candidates. Another expert,
however, testified that "chronological age is not a reliable index of
a person's physical or psychological condition. 21 8 There is some
evidence that systolic and diastolic blood pressure vary with unemployment, probationary employment and promotion. These changes
in blood pressure may be related to the perceived seriousness of the
employment situation and the related personal tension of the
worker. This data is uncertain, however, because there are different
opinions regarding the "significance" of given blood pressure elevations. It is fairly well agreed that any physical or emotional stress
can temporarily elevate pressure or aggravate pre-existing hypertension. The prognostic and diagnostic implications of systolic and
diastolic hypertension may differ. It is certainly open to question
whether prolonged "stress" is a cause of the sustained diastolic
hypertension which some feel represents "true" hypertension. Thus,
reading do not
"hypertension" and a single elevated blood pressure
299
necessarily have the same medical implications.
Tension in anyone, young or old, may create temporary signs
of physical disability2 " However, these signs often disappear when
the external conditions creating the tension are removed. According
to Greyhound, a blanket policy barring employment at thirty-five
years of age is suspect unless the employer can produce evidence of
business necessity. It seems unlikely, as in Duke Power Co., that
employers will be able to establish sufficient business need to justify
a relatively young age limitation. Also, some doctors believe that we
are approaching an era in which certain diseases, like atherosclerosis, can be prevented or reversed, particularly in the sixty-fiveyear and under age group .301 This type of data speaks for the wisdom
of the age discrimination laws, focusing on the individual involved.
In Greyhound Bus, testimony was presented that few accidents
are caused by the physical condition of the driver. For example,
even a bus driver experiencing a heart attack could pull over to the
side of the road without endangering the passengers. As another
indication of the similarity of working conditions for new and old
drivers, it was noted in Greyhound that neither regular nor new
297.
298.
important
299.
300.

301.

354 F. Supp. at 233.
Id. at 234. It would seem that the psychological condition of a driver may be an
factor.
G. SHATrO, supra note 296, at 89.
Id. at 89-91.
J. BmREN, supra note 296, at 53.
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drivers could drive continuously for more than the number of hours
fixed by the Department of Transportation. In contrast to those sex
discrimination cases where employers routinely disqualify women
from jobs merely for physical reasons, the trial judge in Greyhound
was determined to have the employer justify his policy. 21 Since
drivers over forty had a better safety record than those under forty,
the defendant definitely did not sustain the burden of proof. An
additional factor in Greyhound Bus was that the employer, during
periods of peak demand, hired temporary drivers of any age. If the
older and newly hired bus drivers did not create safety problems
during periods of peak demand, there is no reason to suppose that
safety would be burdened if they were permanently hired.
Given the current regulation by the Department of Transportation, there appears to be little need for bus lines to adopt a policy
barring the employment of those over thirty-five years of age.1 3 For
this reason alone, the approach taken by the lower court in
GreyhoundBus is more reasonable than that taken in Tamiani. The
Department of Transportation exempts intra-city bus drivers and
truck drivers ferrying cargo from regulation, but interstate bus drivers are regulated to protect the public interest.3 14 Without mentioning age, those with a history of diabetes mellitus (even if controlled
by hypoglycemic agents), myocardial infarction, or other cardiovascular diseases are ineligible to drive under Department of Transportation regulations.3 5 Granting that medical examinations do not
always uncover physiological, neurological, and other serious disabling disorders, the Department of Transportation has acted to protect the public interest, and the need for carriers to use age as an
additional indicator of physical incapacity seems unjustifiable. It
should also be noted that the carriers are not prevented "from imposing more stringent or additional . . . examinations" than required by the Department of Transportation. 3 If disabilities are
uncovered under a more stringent examination conducted at the
request of the employer, he has the right not to hire the applicant
with a disqualifying disability. While permitting tougher examinations, the regulations fail to mention age as a disqualifying factor.
It is possible that the Department of Transportation could, like
302. One testifying expert felt that drivers over 50 showed an increase in the number
of accidents.
303. 35 FED. REG. 6460 (1970).
304. 49 C.F.R. § 391.2(a) (1973).
305. 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 (1973). Those with a "blood pressure . . . consistently above
160/90 mm. Hg." may be asked to undergo additional examinations to determine whether
eligible to drive a bus or truck carrying hazardous material. 49 C.F.R. § 391.43(c) (1973).
306. 49 C.F.R. § 391.1(b) (1973).
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the F.A.A., supplement its regulations by requiring the retirement
of drivers over sixty years of age. The F.A.A., however, does not
regulate the maximum employment age for pilots and the Department of Transportation could experience difficulty in court if inclined to fix a maximum hiring age. However, more diligent medical
examination to protect the public is within the province of the Department of Transportation. As medical standards are put into operation or tightened, exceptions to the age discrimination laws requested by employers are less tenable. For example, F.A.A. regulations provide that only the doctor who qualifies as an "aviation
medical examiner" can conduct a physical examination. 307 While
the Department of Transportation has not singled out any special
group of medical practitioners, it could limit in some fashion those
eligible to conduct examinations. The Department of Transportation has specified that if "two or more medical examiners disagree
. the Director, on application of that person or a motor carrier,
may determine whether that person is physically qualified. .... ,,30
On April 22, 1974, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court in Greyhound and followed the Tamianiruling without expressly citing it.319 On appeal, Greyhound claimed
that the burden of proof imposed upon it to justify the age hiring
cut-off was improper and that the "hiring policy is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of its business. 310 Because of the public nature of the companies' activities, the court felt that the burden of proof imposed on
the defendant to justify its age-hiring policy was unjustified. While
it might have been proper in other industries, the need for public
safety justified less stringent standards of proof. As stated by the
appellate court:
Greyhound need only demonstrate.
. a minimal increase in risk of harm (to
passengers) ... to show that elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize
the life of one 3or more person(s) that might otherwise occur under the present
hiring system. 1

In reality, the appellate court was asked to decide whether to use
chronological or functional age as a measure of employability. Evidently the court found both standards equally valid. With respect
to the bona fide occupational exception permitted under the age
law, the court felt that the evidence presented by the defendant
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

14 C.F.R. § 67.23 (1974); 30 FED. REG. 12025 (1965).
49 C.F.R. § 391.47 (1973).
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 7 F.E.P. Cases 817 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 818.
Id. at 819.
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supported its claim to an exception. The evidence marshalled included:
1. Medical evidence of changes in the body as one ages. According to the court, however, this was not enough to justify an
exception to the age law.
2. The lack of an assigned run was very demanding. Evidently,
if both an assigned and regular run were available, an exception
might not be in order.
3. Government witnesses and government reports supported
the companies' position that aging has an effect on bus drivers.
It should be noted that expert witness testimony and reports
other than those coming from the government might not be
given such legal weight.
As an alternative remedy, arbitrators frequently entertain
grievances concerning the physical condition of an employee under
a collective bargaining agreement regulated by the Taft-Hartley
Act.3 21 While questions of employee representation of commercial air
carriers are regulated by the Railway Labor Act, bus and truck
drivers represented by unions are regulated by the Taft-Hartley Act.
Due to the multiplicity of administrative regulation, conflicts may
arise. As indicated in Vaca v. Sipes,313 differences of opinion can be
arbitrated when doctors cannot agree upon the physical capabilities
of an employee. While section 391.47 of the Department of Transportation regulations provides that medical differences can be
brought to the Director, this step is not required. Consequently,
medical questions can be brought before arbitrators who weigh expert testimony in making decisions. As indicated in the
Steelworkers trilogy,314 arbitrators' opinions are not to be challenged
by the courts so long as the collective bargaining agreement permits
such decisions. Furthermore, arbitrators are not required to follow
the medical standards established by the Department of Transportation. It can be concluded that arbitrators are no less qualified to
make medical judgments than judges. It would seem, however, that
greater medical expertise would be available in the Department of
Transportation than in arbitrators or judges.
In Gateway Coal Co. v. U.M. W.,111 the Supreme Court decided
312. Cf. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 53 Lab. Arb. 578 (1969). This employer is under
the Railway Labor Act.
313. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
314. Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers Union
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
315. 94 S. Ct. 629 (1974).
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whether questions of safety in coal mines could be ruled upon by
arbitrators, where federal standards have been established." ' The
answer supplied by the Supreme Court was unclear because the air
flow problem had been corrected and the three foremen responsible
had been either retired or suspended. Writing the majority opinion,
Justice Powell favored arbitrability of the dispute on the grounds
that there was no more reason to fear a decision by an arbitrator
than a decision by a public agency. Justice Powell was not concerned that the employer and union selected the arbitrator and not
a public agency or that an arbitrator searching for an answer is
guided somewhat by precedent, background, moral commitment,
and a need to satisfy the employer and union to assure future appointments. It cannot be denied, however, that politics have played
an important role in regulating, or more accurately, not regulating
safety in mines. Thus the fact that arbitrators are selected by the
contestants and are not publicly accountable3 17 for their decisions
leaves room for uneasiness; and Gardner-Denverdoes not require
arbitrators to follow precedent.
The Gateway decision, as it applies to bus and truck drivers,
points to the propriety of regulating matters of public safety before
an arbitrator. While Justice Douglas's opinions in the Steelworkers
trilogy handed arbitrators an awesome amount of power, he disagreed with the Gateway decision on the ground that safety should
not be pidgeonholed with other arbitrable types of disputes. ' " As
stated by Justice Douglas in Gateway:
When it comes to health, safety of life, determination of environmental conditions within the mines, Congress has preempted the field ....

An arbiter

seeks a compromise, an adjustment, an accommodation. There is no mandate
in arbitration to apply a specific law .... 31

If arbitrators seek compromise and there is a need to satisfy appointing employers and unions, a serious question that Justice Powell did not address is whether arbitrators should be permitted to
make decisions in which the public interest is greater than usual.
For example, the Gateway decision did not mention the federal
requirement that a chest roentgenographic examination be conducted under the supervision of the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare, to protect those miners susceptible to what is popu316.

30 U.S.C. §§ 861-78 (1971).

317. See 94 S.Ct. 635-38.
318. See generally id. at 643-44; see United States Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S.
351 (1971).

319.

94 S. Ct. at 645.
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larly known as miners tuberculosis.32 0 It would appear that this kind
of health dispute should not be submitted to arbitration.
D.

Other Industries and Employees

Where public control is absent, the complainant must establish
age discrimination unless the employer accepts the burden of proof
by asserting that discrimination is permissible. 2 ' Some standards
have been announced by the Secretary of Labor, but many ground
rules are now being established on a case-to-case basis. A leading
case is Hodgson v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association,3 in
which a female, weighing 147 pounds, five feet five inches in height,
and forty-seven years of age, was refused employment as a bank
teller. The defendant claimed that her obesity would make standing
difficult for long periods of time. The district court felt that the
plaintiff had not presented evidence sufficient to establish wrongdoing. The appellate court reversed, stating that the plaintiff "is required only to make out a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the
existence of any disparities. ' '3 The appellate court accepted the
following evidence to establish discrimination:
1. From June 12, 1968, the effective date of the age discrimination law, to July 14, 1969, the defendant hired thirty-five bank
tellers, all under forty years.
2. On the applications of the plaintiff and another applicant
over forty, comments of their age appeared. While the defendant
claimed that the writing on the applications was intended to
indicate excessive weight and thick legs, a sign of physical incapacity, evidence was produced that another female who was five
feet five inches in height, 160 pounds, and age twenty-five was
considered employable.
Based on the evidence produced, particularly the failure to hire
anyone over forty years of age, a prima facie case of wrongdoing was
established and the court of appeals shifted the burden of proof to
the employer to justify his decision. The defendant was not able to
present evidence to establish the physical incapacity of the plaintiff
because the physical qualities of thick legs and excessive weight do
not by themselves establish physical incapacity.
320.
321.
322.
323.

30 U.S.C. § 843 (1971); 38 FED. REG. 20076 (1973).
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1971); 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(e) (1973).
3 F.E.P. Cases 16 (S.D. Fla. 1970), modified 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972).
455 F.2d at 822.
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In Hodgson v. Sugar Cane Growers,34 the plaintiff was hired at
age 51 and was later discharged because he allegedly slowed down
while being somewhat overweight. The plaintiff produced evidence
that convinced the court that he was discharged solely because of
age. Following FirstFederal Savings & Loan Association, the court
in Sugar Cane Growers felt that after the plaintiff established a
prima facie case of age discrimination, the burden of establishing
innocence was shifted to the employer. The defendant was not able
to produce evidence that the plaintiff's weight led to a perceptible
slowdown so as to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination.2 What constitutes acceptable evidence of discrimination received
further attention in Schulz v. Hickok Mfg. Co. 3 Experiencing financial difficulty, the defendant discharged a district sales manager
for allegedly insufficient sales. The court felt that the discharge of
other older employees and the hiring of younger employees was
relevant evidence and established a prima facie case of age discrimination that shifted the burden of proof to the employer. The employer was unable to establish innocence because the merit-rating
of the plaintiff was good and sales in his territory had risen by
thirteen percent as compared to an increase of only eleven percent
for the entire firm.
In summation, the courts have implemented public policy by
outlawing age discrimination in two ways. After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of proof shifts
to the employer to establish innocence. Shifting the burden of proof
to the employer eases the plaintiff's evidentiary burden of establishing a violation. Where the physical fitness of the employee is raised,
the defendant has been required to evaluate each employee individually. An exception is the bus driver. The traditional reasons advanced to justify refusals to hire older workers-young executives
are not comfortable directing older employees, employing younger
workers leads to a more stimulating and exciting atmosphere, some
jobs are only suitable for the young, the need to train young people
for the future-are not legally acceptable. If older workers lack the
324. 346 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
325. For similar decisions under federal law see Hodgson v. Earnest Mach. Prod., Inc.,
479 F.2d 1133 (6th Cir. 1973); Billingsley v. Service Technology Corp., 6 F.E.P. Cases 404
(S.D. Tex. 1973); Hodgson v. Career Counsellors Int'l, Inc., 5 F.E.P. Cases 129 (N.D. Ill.
1972). For decisions of a similar nature arising under state laws see School Comm. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 4 F.E.P. Cases 474 (Mass. 1972); Judson v. Apprenticeship & Training Council, 9 Ore. App. 367, 495 P.2d 291 (1972); University of Conn.
v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 4 F.E.P. Cases 1242 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1971).
326. 358 F. Supp. 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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necessary skill or education, firms can hire younger applicants with
the necessary qualifications. Employers are legally responsible,
however, if older job applicants are turned away on the ground that
they are too old to be taught new skills or are insufficiently motivated.
RETIREMENT

Prior to the passage of the state and federal age laws, many
union contracts with employers provided for retirement benefits,
and many questions arose under the Taft-Hartley Act. When these
retirement benefits were not provided by agreement, questions arose
as to whether employees retired by command were discharged for
"just cause. ' '3 7 Decisions have also been made affirming unions'
insistence upon employers bargaining over retirement benefits.3
Courts acknowledge distinctions between retirement, layoff, and
discharge, so that the agreement providing for layoff and discharge
is not controlling if retirement is omitted.2 Where the agreement
is silent, employers retain unilateral control over retirement in the
3
absence of evidence of an anti-union motive. 3
Retirement benefits were soon classified as a mandatory subject
for bargaining, directly linked to wages and hours of employment. 31
A question presented to the Supreme Court in 1971 was whether
employers violate sections 8(a)(1) and (5) by refusing to bargain for
improved medical benefits for retired employees. 33 The NLRB favored bargaining because medical benefits for retirees are akin to
deferred wages. The administrative judge felt that retirees are not
"employees" because they are ineligible to vote in a representation
election. The NLRB, on the other hand, noted that while retirees
are less interested in representation than active workers, they do
have a direct and continuing interest in improving medical benefits.
327. See Protective Workers Union v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952).
328. See Hughes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 26 L.R.R.M. 2317 (W.D. Okla. 1950);
Flowers v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 212 Ga. 142, 91 S.E.2d 41 (1956); Lamon v.
Georgia S. & F. Ry., 212 Ga. 63, 90 S.E.2d 658 (1955).
329. See Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952); Bakery
Workers Local 492 v. National Biscuit Co., 177 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1949).
330. See Cashner v. United States Steel Corp., 327 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1964); United
States Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1956). An issue over which there has
been conflicting opinion is whether an employer who unilaterally retires an employee can be
forced to arbitrate where there is an "all disputes" arbitration clause. See International Tel.
& Tel. Corp. v. Electrical Workers Local 400, 184 F. Supp. 866 (D.N.J. 1960), rev'd, 290 F.2d
581 (3d Cir. 1961).
331. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
332. See Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
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The NLRB philosophized that if workers are valid employees before
retirement or after firms dissolve, there is no reason to categorize
them differently upon retirement. The NLRB expressed the following reasons to justify the placement of retirees in the category of
employees: the inflationary spiral, the intention of Congress to
broadly define the term "employee", the fact that pension and
health benefits are regulated under section 302(b)(5)(B), and the
feeling that it would be erroneous to exempt retirees from the protection of section 8(a)(5). A dissenting member of the NLRB felt
that while an employer could bargain voluntarily for retirees, bargaining should only be mandatory for active employees and for those
333
eligible to vote in union affairs.
The NLRB was reversed by the court of appeals, which
broadly interpreted "employees" in section 2(3) to include retirees.34 In section 8(a)(5), however, Congress created an exception
that required employers to bargain only for employees still working.
Rebuking the NLRB, the appellate court also ruled that, unlike the
administrative charges preferred with the NLRB under section
8(a) (5), section 302 hearings are criminal. Adopting the rationale of
the dissenting member of the NLRB, the appellate court expressed
the fear that retirees could lose benefits if bargaining was required.
The appellate court said that "it is not . . . unlikely that a union
negotiator, presented with the opportunity to advance employees'
wages", would favor active union members . 3 As previously indicated, the average age of the union member could drop, and it is
possible that union negotiators in the future will be less concerned
with retirement benefits.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision on
the following grounds:
1. Congress, through the Taft-Hartley Act, was interested in
minimizing labor disruption, and retirees cannot disrupt interstate commerce.
2. Precedent was not cited by the appellant to support the
claim that "employee" meant someone other than those working
or expecting to work. This type of approach means that the
retiree did not satisfy the burden of proof necessary to establish
that "employee" included retirees.
3. The protection of pension benefits under section 302 is irrel333. This is a matter determined by the union constitution or by-laws and is not a
matter of federal law.
334. 427 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1970).
335. Id. at 947.
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evant to the duty imposed upon the employer to bargain in good
faith under section 8(a) (5). Section 302 allows employers to provide pension benefits properly administered without violating
the general ban against payoffs to union officials.
4. Retiree interest in collective bargaining is limited, especially
where the union constitution does not permit voting in union
affairs.
Irrespective of whether pension benefits for retired employees
are voluntary or mandatory, the Supreme Court noted in Pittsburgh
Plate Glass that most firms view pension benefits for active and
retired employees as a mandatory bargaining subject.3" To support
this position, a recent survey discloses that pension benefits are
specified in ninety percent of the agreements. 371 From this data, it
seems fair to conclude that employers long ago conceded that retirement benefit bargaining is required for active employees. The same
survey discloses that disability retirement is contractually specified
before sixty-five years of age in seventy-six percent of the plans
surveyed, and ninety-two percent permit early retirement. 38 More
than fifty percent of the contracts require employees seeking pension benefits to be sixty-five years of age or older and employed by
the same firm for a minimum often years.339 Agreements permitting
early retirement, at not less than fifty-five years of age, call for
reduced benefits with ten to fifteen years of employment.3 4 Seventysix percent of the agreements also provide for disability benefits
after ten to twenty years of employment.3 1 If unemployment continues to mount, it seems reasonable to assume that union-employer
bargaining increasingly will focus on providing full benefits for those
less than sixty-five years of age.112 This means that the "bona fide"
aspects of early retirement under the age laws could receive increased scrutiny.
To determine whether a pension system is "bona fide" under
an age discrimination law, the courts should consider the following
336.
337.

404 U.S. at 176.
BNA PENSION & OThER RETIREMENT BENEFITS, PPF Survey No. 103, Oct. 1973, at

1.
338. Id. at 3.
339. Id. at 6-7.
340. Id. at 9.
341. Id. at 11.
342. The energy crisis has already affected the bargaining patterns of unions where
retirement is concerned. See CLC Challenge to Airline Increases, Summary of Development,
84 LAB. REL. RFP. 3 (1973). See also General Motors and Voluntary Overtime, 84 LAB. REL.
REP. 308 (1973).
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factors: (1) whether the plans are unilaterally established by employers or with unions; (2) the compulsory age of retirement; (3) the
circumstances under which retirement can be postponed; (4)
whether retirement is voluntary or compulsory; and (5) the benefits
paid. Even though in recent years the number of plans permitting
voluntary retirement before sixty-five without loss of benefits have
increased, sixty-five years of age is still the most common age of
compulsory retirement. Since social security awards have been and
continue to be inadequate, unions push employers to supplement
these benefits. Some individuals retiring before sixty-five have been
forced to return to the labor force by inflation and inadequate benefits. Further anxiety among the retired is created by the fact that
few of the current plans provide for cost-of-living adjustments.
Some plans permitted earlier retirement for female than for
male employees. Today, different retirement benefits for male and
female employees in the same bargaining unit probably violate Title
VII, a sign of sex discrimination. Because of actuarial differences,
however, reconciling the 1967 age discrimination law and Title VII
prohibiting sex discrimination poses some problems. Since the average male does not live as long as the average female-there is a
three-year differential-compulsory or voluntary retirement at
sixty-five means that the average female receives benefits for more
years than the average male, thereby giving rise to a possible violation of Title VII. While Title VII could be interpreted to exclude the
retiree, it prohibits sex discrimination at all ages. Before retirement,
male employees could point to Title VII because their total benefits
will be less than those of female employees (where both are entitled
to the same monthly amounts). Would the federal age discrimination law be violated if women are paid less retirement benefits than
men because women live longer? Section 4(a)(1) of the federal age
discrimination law does not forbid discriminatory retirement plans
geared to sex, but it does outlaw discriminatory hiring practices and
compensation. In this way, the federal law is pertinent to sex discrimination in retirement. The question arises as to whether bargaining goals should place more emphasis on raising wages and less
on retirement benefits. This position indicates that unions and employers view retirement benefits as an extension of wages. Section
4(a) (2) also prohibits the classification by employers of an employee
so that he is deprived "of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect[ed in] his status as an employee. . . ." The same
prohibition is imposed upon unions in section 4(c)(1) and (2).
Should more collective bargaining agreements call for earlier retire-
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ment, the question whether unions fairly represent members forced
to retire before sixty-five will be raised more frequently.
The responsibility for setting the compulsory retirement of airline pilots at sixty years of age was assumed by the FAA. 3 3 However, the question of whether physically fit pilots could be forced to
retire at sixty under the federal age discrimination law raises another question. In the absence of a showing of an illegal motive
violating the Railway Labor Act or Taft-Hartley Act, employers and
unions were free to establish any retirement age and impose sundry
conditions by contract. In terms of overall legal difficulty, the required retirement of pilots at sixty years of age was less questionable
than in other occupations because a neutral federal agency fixed the
age.34 4 The FAA selected sixty as the compulsory retirement age
because medical data pointed to the possibility of sudden incapacitation and the slowdown of reflex reaction. Furthermore, it can be
reasoned that the federal age law was directed against standards set
by private employers, not a neutral public agency, and that most
employees of private employers do not hold positions of specific
"public interest." The income loss faced by retiring pilots seems
inconsequential when balanced against the need for public safety.
There is also a greater reluctance on the part of judges to second
guess decisions made by an administrative agency presumably composed of experts than to question those decisions made by employers
and unions. While employers and unions typically compromise to
reach a workable solution, the public interest should be less amenable to compromise.
Evidently, where a public agency sets the retirement age, the
burden of establishing a discriminatory policy is on the plaintiff
while the burden of establishing its propriety is on the private employer making a similar decision.3 41 The Wage and Hour Division
has accepted the sixty years of age compulsory retirement rule for
pilots, but, until recently, most of the employees of airline carriers
were less than forty-five years of age.3 41 Typically, a declining industry has a higher percentage of older employees than younger employees.3 Employers in declining industries often seek to attract
343. The Wage and Hour Division has already approved of compulsory retirement of
pilots at age 60, categorizing them as a "bona fide" exception. 8 LAB. REL. REP. 401:5203
(1968).
344. See Chew v. Quesada, 182 F. Supp. 231 (D.D.C. 1960), aff'd sub. nom., Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 286 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
345. See generally Barry v. Flint Fire Dep't, 44 Mich. App. 602, 205 N.W.2d 627 (1973).
346. See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Employment and Retirement Incomes of
the Special Senate Comm. on Aging, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 9, at 1173 (1969).
347. F. CLARK & A. DUNNE, AGEING IN INDUSTRY 11 (1955).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

young blood and to force the retirement of older employees before
sixty-five. Early retirement in a declining industry might indicate
age discrimination and should be viewed more suspiciously than
similar action in a growing industry.
There is some conflict between contracts calling for mandatory
retirement before sixty-five and state and federal age laws. For example, suppose a thirty-year employee, age fifty, is required to retire under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The mandatory contractual provision might violate state and federal age
laws and sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Forcing an employee to retire at the age of fifty could be a sign of
bargaining in bad faith while mandatory retirement at sixty-two
appears to be acceptable. An opinion from the Wage and Hour
Administrator declares that section 4(f) (2) does not outlaw involuntary retirement at sixty-two years of age if the agreement is otherwise bona fide.3 18 It seems unlikely that compulsory retirement at
sixty-two, especially if the benefits are not reduced, can be challenged under the Taft-Hartley Act. If early retirement is voluntary,
there is little likelihood that the agreement can be challenged under
either an age law or the Taft-Hartley Act.
In Murgia v. MassachusettsBoard of Retirement,49 the plaintiff, a state police officer with twenty years of service, was required
to retire at age fifty pursuant to Massachusetts law. Since the plaintiff established the unconstitutionality of the state law, the court
did not rule upon the question of burden of proof. Aside from the
plaintiffs physical fitness and interest in continuing his employment, no facts were set forth to establish a rational basis for the
state law. It can be assumed that the law could not be rationalized
merely because the morale of the younger members of the force
would be improved by the retirement of older officials. Thus, the
basic issue in Murgia was whether fifty is a reasonable age for mandatory retirement. Unlike Airline Pilots v. Quesada,350 where a
forced retirement of an airline pilot at sixty was deemed necessary
for the public safety, the defendant in Murgia did not produce statistical evidence that police officials over fifty years of age were a
threat to the public or that they could not satisfactorily perform
their jobs.
Merely because an employee is required to retire before sixty348. 8 BNA 1974 LAB. REL. REP., F.E.P. MANUAL § 401, at 5215.
349. 8 F.E.P. Cases 18 (D. Mass. 1974).
350. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 286 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 962 (1961).
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five years of age it is not necessarily a violation of state31 or federal
law. The Social Security Act permits retirement before sixty-five
and after sixty-two years of age,- 2 but the retiree is forced to accept
reduced benefits. It appears likely that compulsory retirement at
sixty-two will be accepted by the judiciary under the age laws even
if benefits are somewhat reduced. However, the younger the age of
forced retirement, the greater the likelihood that the judiciary will
make a finding of age discrimination. In fact, if the benefits seem
to be grossly inadequate or grossly reduced because of the early
retirement, greater suspicion is raised as to the "bona fide" quality
of the retirement plan. 353 Requiring people to retire at a relatively
young age may be unreasonable, especially if this requirement is not
uniformly followed."' Collective bargaining agreements and retirement benefits change, but changes alone are not signs of disparate
administration or unfairness. To date, no decisions have been reported under the federal law where a retirement plan has been labeled unfair because benefits were inadequate or the age was unreasonably young. Since retirees over sixty-two years of age receive
Social Security benefits, establishing age discrimination violations
due to inadequate benefits will be difficult because employers are,
after all, supplementing federal payments. 5 Where claims are
made that compulsory retirement violates the federal age law, the
best method of establishing violations is to show that some claim3 56
ants are treated differently than others.
A novel situation arose in Hodgson v. American HardwareMutual Insurance Co.-" After electing not to participate in the firm's
retirement plan, the plaintiff was discharged when she reached
sixty-two years of age. The plaintiff claimed that the 1967 law was
351. See Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 L.R.R.M. 2553 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1964),
aff'd, 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307 (1965). Contra, 30 L.R.R.M. 124 (1952), which states
that Massachusetts is an exception to this rule and is an exception to the federal rule. See
also Gebhard v. GAF Corp., 5 F.E.P. Cases 1043 (D.D.C. 1973).
352. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970).
353. See Walker Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 27 Wis. 2d 669, 135 N.W.2d 307 (1965).
354. See Retail Clerks Local 770 v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 5 F.E.P. Cases 1131 (C.D.
Cal. 1973); Barry v. Flint Fire Dep't, 44 Mich. App. 602, 205 N.W.2d 627 (1973); McIlvaine
v. State Police, 6 Pa. Cmwlth. 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972), af'd, 454 Pa. 129, 309 A.2d 801 (1973),
appeal dismissed, 415 U.S. 986 (1974). See also Norman v. United States, 392 F.2d 255 (Ct.
Cl. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018 (1969).
355. Admittedly, retirement under Social Security at 62 theoretically is voluntary.
356. See Hodgson v. Earnest Mach. Prods., Inc., 5 F.E.P. Cases 1311 (6th Cir. 1973).
Discrimination was not established when a 64-year-old part-time employee was retired when
she refused full-time work. But note in this case that the employee could have continued to
work.
357. 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971).
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on her side since she was not entitled to retirement benefits. Bowing
to the expertise of the Department of Labor and its interpretation
of section 4(a)(1), the court favored the plaintiff because the employer, without contractual guidance or other precedent, discharged
her at sixty-two. The fact that the plaintiff had elected not to participate in the retirement plan was apparently irrelevant. The rationale for the opinion of the court rested on the similarity between a
discharge at sixty-two and a refusal to hire and noted that section
4(f) (2) only prohibits the latter when retirement benefits are provided. 5 While the discharge of the plaintiff was essentially treated
as a subterfuge because retirement was on a selective basis, neither
the Department of Labor nor the court expressly stated that the
retirement plan violated the law.
In Stringfellow v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 355 the plaintiffs were
involuntarily retired at an early age by the defendant due to a slack
in business. The court did not consider the fact that none of the
plaintiffs were represented by a union. The court found for the
defendant, who claimed that the selection of those working or retiring was based on eighteen criteria, and was necessitated by the fact
that few of the workers were under forty. The plaintiffs felt that
seniority should have determined retention, but an employer is not
obliged to resort to seniority in the absence of a collective bargaining
clause. Furthermore, the plaintiffs could not produce evidence that
the defendant's evaluation was biased; in fact, the defendant tried
to find other jobs for the plaintiffs."'
CONCLUDING COMMENT

The interpretation so far of the 1967 law seems to follow congressional intent. Employers have a legitimate interest in
productivity, and medical evidence to date does not establish a
substantial diminution of skill or productivity with age. Not only
has medical science uncovered means of controlling many disabilities associated with age, but unions and technology help workers
suffering from minor medical and production problems. Unions protect older workers by negotiating protective seniority clauses which
eliminate competition form younger employees seeking promotion
358. Note that discrimination in the age of retirement between male employees and
female employees violates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which forbids sex discrimination. See Roper v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 409 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1969); Hodgson v.
American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 329 F. Supp. 225 (D. Minn. 1971). See also No. 70471, 2
F.E.P. Cases 412 (EEOC 1970); Note, Age Discriminationin Employment: The Problem of
the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 405 (1966).
359. 320 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Ark. 1970).
360. See Grossfield v. W.B. Saunders Co., 1 F.E.P. Cases 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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or retention. In addition, unions have some voice in establishing
production standards in the plant, and modern technology has relieved workers of many of the heavy and distasteful jobs. Another
important factor is that the huge increase in new jobs since World
War H has been greater in white collar than in blue collar employment. This is important when one notes that age has less effect on
white collar jobs than blue collar jobs, particularly at the unskilled
and semiskilled levels. Given the medical breakthroughs, bargaining strength of unions, and developing technology, workers today
are less likely to be troubled by age than workers of the past.
The courts have not been faced with a situation in which a
worker with a physical disability that reduces his productive capacity could be helped significantly if the employer would redesign the
job or assign him to another job that he could fill.36' In fact, the early
and compulsory retirement of older workers may not be "bona fide"
under these circumstances. Some states, such as Iowa, 1 2 already
prohibit employment discrimination against the handicapped. Is an
age discrimination law violated where the employer is unwilling to
redesign the job or refuses to assign him to another available job?
Society's interest in protecting older workers as well as those with
physical disabilities lends support to the notion that the law may
be violated if the employer is unwilling to lighten the employee's
burden.
Few employers exhibit an interest in protecting older employees
by redesigning jobs or shifting them to other suitable jobs. 3 As
more people live longer and the birth rate drops, the public interest
in protecting older employees will be intensified. Judges and company leaders are generally older than other white collar workers and
are perhaps inclined to sympathize with the public view that older
workers are entitled to extensive protection. 6 4
The few decisions interpreting the 1967 legislation are perhaps
signs of humanizing the depersonalized business world as it strives
to maximize profits. To relieve themselves of the burden of making
decisions, businessmen seek technological change and standardized
conditions of work. These decisions are too frequently made without
thought of improving the quality of life or the social responsibility
of the firm. Decisions establishing standards are frequently made
without hard data. A point has been reached in interpreting social
361.

This sometimes is accomplished via a collective bargaining agreement.

362. 8 BNA 1974 LAB. REL.
363.
364.

REP., F.E.P. MANUAL § 451, at 401, 403.

See 90 Mo. LAB. REv. 47 (1967).
W. DONAHUE & C. Tirrrs, PoLrncs OF AGE 101-04.
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legislation where judges question business standards and adopt an
individual rights approach. While probability data like smoking and
cancer incidence is medically useful, it can prevent individuals from
leading satisfactory lives in industry.
In a limited fashion, those courts looking at the age laws are
touching a human nerve by prohibiting the use of impersonal and
unverified business policies. While employers prefer the comfort of
standards which might deny employment to the fifty-year-old applicant, legislatures and courts, by shifting the burden of proof and
other devices, are finding that individuals are paramount. So far,
management objection has been muted rather than roaring. Perhaps a sympathetic climate for pro-employee decisions has been
created because of the industrial fate befalling those in managerial
positions.
There is speculation that many colleges and universities will be
hard hit in the near future by the EEOC because of sex discrimination. It can also be anticipated that the institutions of higher
learning will soon be faced with many charges of age discrimination. 6 5 Because of the limited funds available and the attitudes of
some administrators, older employees who find it difficult to move
to other jobs are given only small wage increases. This failure to
match the cost of living of older employees while younger and more
mobile members fare better proportionately may well be a sign of
age discrimination. It seems possible that these institutions are indeed vulnerable to charges of age discrimination. Since the federal
laws were amended in 1974 to cover state employment, some fireworks can be anticipated at state universities.
365.

See

NEWSWEEK,

June 17, 1974, at 75-76.
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